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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2011, public sector employees in Botswana engaged in a two-month-long legal 
strike over a wage dispute. The right to strike is a highly contentious and debatable 
right. None of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions makes an 
express reference to the right to strike but the ILO supervisory bodies insist that the 
right to strike is a fundamental right that confers power on trade unions to defend the 
interests of their members. By virtue of the decisions of ILO’s main two bodies, 
member states cannot admit the right of free association and to bargain collectively 
and then deny workers the right to strike.  Furthermore, according to ILO, the right to 
strike extends to all workers in the public service, the only allowable exception being 
for employees directly involved in the administration of the state and ‘essential 
services’. 
Although several countries entrench this right in their constitution, violation is 
widespread. In such countries, while the right to strike exists in principle in reality it 
is essentially curtailed by unworkable procedures, as it is the case in Botswana. The 
2011 public sector strike exposed the frailties of Botswana’s industrial relations, a 
country popularly eulogized as Africa’s economic miracle and a shining example of 
democracy. This study examined the lessons brought by the 2011 strike on the 
character of industrial relations system of Botswana. The study was largely guided by 
a qualitative paradigm and data was obtained through individual face-to-face 
interviews, Skype and focus group interviews as well as document review.  
This study established that there is a historical conflict between Botswana trade 
unions and the government. The 2011 strike inflamed already adversarial industrial 
relations. The findings of study confirm that following the 2011 public sector strike, 
the government has been hostile and vindictive to public sector unions especially 
those which steered the 2011 strike. Subsequent to the 2011 strike, the government 
rescinded most of the rights and freedoms that union leaders used to enjoy. There is a 
general consensus among public servants and their unions that Botswana labour 
relations has always been hostile towards trade unions and their activities, but this 
hostility has been obscured by the common review that Botswana is democratic, 
peaceful and an epitome of good governance in Africa. However, the 2011 public 
sector strike uncovered this mask. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 	  
1.1.  Overview of the Study 
Botswana is a landlocked country, neighbouring South Africa in the west, 
Zimbabwe in the east, Namibia in the north and Zambia in the northeast. The country 
has an estimated population of 2 million people spread over an area of about 600,000 
square kilometres (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; World Bank, 2013).This 
research is a response to the continued need for understanding the character of labour 
relations in Africa, with particular reference to the right to strike in Botswana. 
Labour relations entail a relationship between workers, trade unions, 
employers and the government. In Botswana, the collective rights and freedoms of 
trade unions and consequently of workers, although formally recognised, are in fact 
severely restricted. This has led Marobela (2011); Mogalakwe (1994) and Motshegwa 
and Tshukudu (2012) to concur that Botswana’s labour relations system is hostile 
towards workers’ rights, particularly those relating to industrial action. In support of 
this view is the government’s response to the 2011 debilitating public servants’ strike, 
which spanned for almost two months. 
This research report, documents the challenges faced by trade unions in 
Botswana and how the 2011 strike has exacerbated these challenges, in particular, 
their strained relationship with the government of Botswana.  
 
1.2. Aims and Objectives 
The main objective of this study was to examine the character of the labour 
relations system in Botswana. In order to realise the general aim of the study, the 
following were the specific objectives of the study:  
a. To investigate the development of organised labour movement in Botswana 
from a historical perspective with a leaning towards the right to unionise and 
engage in industrial action in the public service 
b. To examine the prevailing labour conditions relating to the right to strikes as 
contained in the Public Service Act with specific reference to instances 
relating and/or concerning the historical public servants’ strike of 2011 
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c.  To investigate the readiness of the government to cope with the changed 
landscape and the potent weapon conferred to employees in industrial relations 
viz-a-vis the right to strike.  
 
1.3.  Research Questions 
The study sought to answer the following questions:  
a. What is the historical development of organised labour movement in 
Botswana and the right to freedom of association in the public service? 
b. Does the present legislative framework demonstrate the willingness of the 
government to grant full labour rights to workers in the public service?  
c. In light of the status quo, is there a justifiable need to reform the legal 
framework to further liberalise it and make it conform more to international 
standards? 
1.4.  Labour relations in Africa 	  
The term ‘labour relations’ is sometimes used interchangeably with industrial 
relations (Motshegwa and Tshukudu, 2012:119). By definition, labour relations refer 
to “the relationships between people who work and those for whom they work” 
(Bendix, 2008:3).According to Holley (2009:6) labour relations “involves managers 
(representing the ownership interests) and a labour organisation agent representing the 
interest of a group of employees engaged in the joint determination and administration 
of the work rules”. In a nutshell, labour relations refers to the relationship between 
employees and management originating from the direct or indirect union-employer 
relationship (Giri, 2008). On the other hand, industrial relations is seen as “a set of 
phenomena, both within and outside the workplace, concerned with determining and 
regulating the employment relationship” (Salomon, 1998:3). Meanwhile some 
authors, for instance (Mabey et al, 2001; Bratton and Gold, 1999) associate industrial 
relations with collective bargaining, trade unions and strikes.  
According to Dunlop (1958), every industrial relations system consists of 
actors i.e. managers, workers and their representatives; certain contexts and an 
ideology which come together to establish rules that govern the actors at the 
workplace and in the work community. The key aspect of industrial relations is the 
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employment relationship. Michon (1992:224 in Dibben, Klerck and Wood, 2011), 
defines employment relationship as “the set of conditions determining the exchange, 
use and reproduction of the labour force”. The employment relationship is therefore 
“the product of economic, social, political, legal and technological developments as 
well as the ways in which various actors interpret and respond to these developments” 
(Dibben, Klerck and Wood, 2011:2).  
Developing Dunlop’s argument, Flanders (1965 in Singh 2008) argues that 
industrial relations system is ‘a system of rules’. Although each actor in the system 
may have their own ideology, the rules aid them to have a common understanding. 
These rules, as Singh (2008) explains, appear in legislation and statutory order, trade 
union regulations, collective agreements and arbitration awards. Industrial relations, 
therefore, is a system of initiating rules.  Flanders (1965) and Dunlop (1958)’s models 
make an inference that industrial system is capable of self-maintenance and 
containment of conflict through web of rules that govern actors within it. Critics like 
Hyman (1975) have vehemently lambasted such claims. According to Hyman (1975), 
industrial relations system is largely interactions of conflict and should incorporate 
the contradictory processes within the capitalist system.  
Hyman (1975) in Anyim, Ikemefuna and Ekwoaba (2012:40), postulates that 
“the quest for control of work brings workers into direct confrontation with the 
management and considers government and its regulatory agencies as mere tools of 
influential individuals or groups who perpetrate their selfish interests”. Furthermore, 
Hyman (1977 in Frege, Kelly and McGovern 2011) indicates that in a capitalist 
economy there exists a radical conflict of interest between the capitalist class and the 
working class. In essence, conflict is what underlies the industrial relations system. 
The central feature of industrial relations, Hyman argues, is unceasing power struggle 
(Hyman, 1977 in Joseph, 2004). “Industrial Relations in the context of capitalist 
politico-economic structure and concomitant socio-economic inequality, becomes a 
struggle between those who control and those who are controlled. That is, a struggle 
between conflicting interests” (Hyman, 1977 in Joseph, 2004:39).  
According to Sinha, Sinha and Shekhar (2006), industrial conflict is human 
conflict especially when labour relationship is unequal. Those who own the means of 
production boast enormous power. In most cases, the interest of the state and 
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employers is opposed to those of employees thus industrial conflict is based upon the 
pursuit of self-interest in the economic life by these three actors. “The coming 
together of workers motivated by their urge of obtaining the highest possible wages 
and the owners of capital motivated by profit maximisation is the basic cause of 
industrial conflict in the capitalist economic system” (Sinha et al., 2006:156).This 
conflict becomes apparent when strikes become frequent. Industrial conflict largely 
occurs because of economic factors and seldom due to non-economic factors such as 
disagreeable working conditions.  According to Bendix (2010), industrial conflict can 
be contained by widely distributing power to prevent the dominant groups from 
gaining absolute control.  This is in line with the pluralist approach, identified as the 
best means of accommodating the interests of the working class within the capitalist 
economic system. Bendix (2010),indicates that, “Pluralism, when applied to labour 
relationship accepts that there will always be conflict between employers and 
employees, but assumes that the power of the employer inherent in the relationship 
can be balanced by countervailing power of the collectivity and that conflict can be 
contained by ‘orderly’ collective bargaining” (Bendix, 2010:25). However, the same 
cannot be said about Botswana, as it will be demonstrated by the literature reviewed 
that the government’s power exceeds the influence of collective bargaining.    
 
In many countries including African countries, the state is the most powerful 
player in industrial relations. As the dominant player and the chief employer, as it is 
in African countries like Botswana, the government enacts laws governing the 
industrial relations system. Dzimbiri (2008) argues that although African states are 
diverse, they share several features such as the predisposition to intervene in both 
economic and political domains. The majority of African states have evolved from 
pre-colonial tribally based societies through colonialism to become independent 
states. After gaining independence from the colonial regime, many African states 
pursued socialist strategies. However, this fell out of favour in the early 1980s with 
the advent of neoliberalism. Owing to the reforms, consequential of neoliberalism, 
African countries such as Zambia, Tanzania and Guinea experienced serious 
economic downturn. 
The failure of socialism was not exclusively due to economic downturns, for 
during the era of Cold War, there were also deliberate moves by the former colonial 
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powers and associated international associations to destabilise socialist governments. 
According to Marobela (2011) any serious analysis of industrial relations in Africa 
cannot ignore the role played by imperialist accumulation. For example the cases of 
Angola and Mozambique where US imperialism backed rebels and mercenaries to 
destabilise the governments in search for natural resources like oil. As Osabu-Kle 
(nd:1) explains, “there are several motives of imperialism including strategic, cultural, 
settlement of surplus population, economic, and prestige reasons, but the economic 
motive was principally what provided the impetus for Western colonisation of the 
Third World and for the establishment of neocolonialism instead of decolonisation”. 
The demise of socialism undoubtedly also has roots in exploitative motive of 
imperialism. “When monopoly capitalism expands globally, its exploitative interest 
and that of imperialism become so fused that the two become integrated into an 
inseparable entity” (ibid). 
The collapse of many socialist states paved way for the triumph of the 
capitalist market system. Since the economic downturn of the 1980s through to the 
1990s, there has been pressure on many African countries to restructure their 
economies and adopt neoliberal reforms. According to Konings (2011:1), from the 
1980s neoliberalism, championed by powerful agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, has been the dominant development 
agenda in Africa. These agencies pressured African states to implement macro-
economic stabilisation programs known as the Structural adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
(Konings, 2011). SAPs under the backing of IMF and World Bank are directed to 
countries in need of financial aid. To qualify for loans from the IMF and the World 
Bank, countries have to make some adjustments in their economic structure. These 
include privatisation of state owned assets, liberalisation of markets and restriction of 
state interference in the running of the economy. 
These neoliberal adjustments have engendered extremely high levels of 
social inequalities in recipient countries. SAPs have also played a significant role in 
severing relations between governments and labour. Although Mogalakwe (1994) 
suggests that a more liberal form of state can curtail the resultant ills of SAPs, this 
may not necessarily be a very ideal solution as evidenced by Botswana’s labour 
relations system.   
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Botswana has been widely cited as one of the outstanding champions of 
liberal democracy in Africa. The implication is that the government of Botswana 
endorses a political system based on principles of worker rights and good industrial 
relations are allowed to flourish. Nonetheless, there are diverse accounts of Botswana 
democracy, and whether the country is indeed an epitome of democracy remains 
debatable. Whilst Good (2008) depicts Botswana democracy as authoritarian 
liberalism and elitist, Mogalakwe (1994) argues it is capitalist and subordinates the 
rights of workers to those of the state.  
1.5. Evolution Botswana as a democracy 	  
To understand the context of labour and trade union movement’s relations with 
government, it is necessary to consider the country’s broad trajectory of political and 
economic development since independence. Botswana has often been branded as a 
country with unparalleled sustained political stability, economic progress and a good 
governance record in Sub Saharan Africa (Lebang and Olsen, 1994 and Maipose, 
2009). The country has often been labeled as Africa’s economic miracle and a shining 
example of democracy. This is against the backdrop of a continent notorious for 
economic mismanagement, military dictatorships and one party government 
(Mogalakwe, 1997). The country has, since independence in 1966, been governed 
uninterruptedly by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). According to Taylor 
(2000:3), “both the growth and developmental record of independent Botswana has 
been impressive and Botswana has, according to the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), made the ‘most’ progress in human development since 1960”. 
The country has enjoyed periods of economic growth when the rest of postcolonial 
Africa wrestled with political corruption and dismal economic performance (Stedman, 
1993). Botswana’s success story of democracy is substantiated by its multiparty 
liberal democratic system, positive human right reports and stable political system 
(Stedman, 1993).  	  
From 1885-1966 Botswana, which was called Bechuanaland Protectorate at 
that time, was under British colonial rule. Today, the country is famous for its 
political stability, eulogised for its good governance in Africa and deeply entrenched 
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democratic principles (Stedman, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2001; UNESCO, 2013 and 
World Bank, 2013). Beaulier and Subrick (2006) assert that being a British colony 
endowed Botswana with the advantage of illustrious institutions. Hlavac (2010) on the 
other hand locates the success of Tswana institutions in Britain’s colonial neglect, 
affirming that it allowed some crucial political and economic institutions to survive. 
This neglect, according to Acemoglu et al. (2001), allowed Botswana to sustain a 
political equilibrium of a nature that no other African country could.   
During colonialism, “Botswana’s political organisations and institutions were 
built upon the influence of both the pre-colonial Tswana culture and the British 
colonial administrators” (Hlavac, 2010:12). Although British colonisers had some 
influence in the Tswana political organisations and institutions, their involvement in 
the country’s politics was minimal owing to the perception that Botswana lacked 
natural resources. Cook and Sarkin (2010:460) affirm that “Botswana suffered less 
colonial intrusion than many of its neighbouring countries, which European nations 
ruled more bureaucratically as colonies”. Furthermore, a lack of roads into the country 
also limited the ability of the colonisers to influence the affairs of their colony. In 
consequence, “there was simply no cost effective way that the British could monitor 
the events in Botswana” (Beaulier and Subrick, 2006:3).   
Acemoglu et al. (2001) posit that Botswana was primarily integrated into the 
British Empire due to its strategic location and not because the country was thought to 
be particularly valuable or attractive in itself. Furthermore, Parsons (1984:22) 
propounds that “the only role the British played in Bechuanaland was to arm the 
people to protect themselves from the Germans in South West Africa and the Boers in 
the Transvaal”. According to Harvey and Lewis (1990) this was to advance the 
interest of the British to prevent the Boers and the Germans from interfering with the 
route from Cape Colony to territories in Central Africa, which at the time were under 
British control and influence. Owing to this, the Bechuanaland’s political 
administration was left under the control of Tswana Chiefs.  
1.6. The Tswana Political System 	  
During the early days of colonialism, political leadership and power structure were 
bestowed on Tswana chiefs and reserved for male heirs. These Tswana males, who 
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mostly were cattle owners, wielded extensive authority over their subjects. The chief 
was seen as a necessary link with ancestors, hence respect was accorded to him and 
his customary right to rule (Edge and Lekorwe, 1998). At the centre of the chief’s 
administration was the traditional assembly called the kgotla. The kgotla, as 
Somolokae (1998) explains, is a traditional meeting place where the chief met with 
his advisors and subjects to discuss matters affecting their village. “This traditional 
assembly was and is still a public forum for Tswana traditional leaders and their 
subjects to air pertinent views” (Somolokae, 1998:5).   
The Kgotla was also used as a podium on which subjects, including 
commoners, could give opinion as well as express disapproval. In responding to the 
subjects’ issues of concern, the chief consulted the stakeholders such as the male 
elders of the village who served as advisors to the chief. “The Tswana consensus-
based arrangements and traditional constraints on the chief’s rule stood in sharp 
contrast with other polities in sub-Saharan Africa, most of which have developed 
political institutions with powerful ruling and warrior classes” (Hlavac, 2010:13). 
According to Holm (1998:198) traditional values of public discussion, community 
consensus, non-violence and moderation are critical elements of a democratic political 
culture.  It is in this regard that the Tswana Political system was understood to 
epitomise some form of participatory democracy where people could exchange their 
views and influence final decisions affecting the society at large (Mgadla, 1998). 
Owing to this, the Kgotla is considered one of the earliest pillars of Botswana’s 
democracy (Seidler, 2010) because it is where Botswana’s ruling elite demonstrated 
its commitment to non-predatory rule (Beaulier and Subrick, 2006).  
 Nonetheless, Good (2008) contends that the chiefs exploited the kgotla for 
their own personal gains. He claims, “the much romanticised kgotla system was 
actually a forum where the chief had the final say and modern practices like decision 
making by the majority vote played no part” (Good, 2008:27). Sharing similar 
sentiments with Good (2008), Maundeni (2008) criticises the kgotla system for 
reducing the population to the role of mere spectators and not active partakers. By 
implication, Good (2008) rebuffs the belief that the kgotla accords equal space to all 
citizens. He observes that only individuals who command some degree of influence 
such as cattle owners were accorded the platform to speak during kgotla meetings. 
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Maundeni (2008) on the other hand infers that, subjects could not engage in robust 
debates with their rulers as the Tswana tradition compels them to agree with their 
chiefs. These undemocratic principles are preserved by some Setswana idioms such as 
Mafoko a kgosi a agelwa mosako, which generally means that once the chief and his 
cabinet agrees upon a law everyone must abide by it without questioning it. The 
implication is that, for as long as the chief has endorsed a law, nobody should attempt 
to amend it as the chief’s word is final. The findings of this study will demonstrate 
that these unfair Tswana customs have significantly influenced Botswana labour laws 
and the prevailing violation of workers’ rights.  
 Although the Tswana political system of bogosi largely permeated the lives of 
Batswana, the powers of the chief were somewhat neutralised when the British 
administration, after many years of treating Bechuanaland as a temporary expedient, 
resolved to assert colonial authority over the protectorate and subsequently Tswana 
chiefs (Acemoglu et al., 2001). New policies, which sought to limit the powers of 
chiefs, were introduced. The British administration granted the people opportunity to 
complain against individual chiefs; by 1910 chiefs were stripped off some of their 
powers. According to Seidler (2010) beforehand, chiefs enjoyed paramount legal, 
judicial and executive powers but the new colonial policies limited these powers. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) indicate that Chief Tshekedi Khama of the Bangwato tribe 
and Bathoen of the Bangwaketse challenged British colonial policies in the courts. 
“Although they lost the formal case, the united opposition of the chiefs essentially 
blocked the imposition of the new policies” (Acemoglu et al., 2001:14).  
 Upon the realisation that Tswana chiefs commanded great respect from the 
Tswana population, the British administrators enlisted their support. Arguably this 
was a tactic of ruling Batswana through chiefs. As a result, over time, Tswana chiefs 
lost their independence and the liberty of running their own affairs without the 
interference of colonial masters. British interference removed many of the chiefs’ 
powers such as the right to all stray cattle and the right to call for unpaid labour 
services from their tribesmen (Robinson, 2009:11). Colonial interference had both 
negative and positive outcomes for the Tswana chiefdoms, a scenario that Sakhela 
Buhlungu has termed, in a very different context, a ‘paradox of victory’. Although 
interference weakened the powers of chiefs, it also profited them through the 
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modernisation of Tswana society.  
 Modernisation manifested itself in the implementation of English language, 
labour markets and cash based European institutions. The factors that influenced the 
new developments included taxation, urbanisation, education, and the work of 
missionaries (Seidler, 2010). Tswana chiefs personally benefited from their 
collaboration with the colonial administration. The 10% commission that chiefs 
received from taxation strengthened their political and economic power (Seidler, 
2010:21). Furthermore, the pursuit of economic interests was crucial to chiefs in that 
it earned them political support from fellow economically powerful elite (Seidler, 
2010).  
 Note further that participation of chiefs in both political and economic 
activities was formally regulated by their commitment to a mandated system of 
representative governance.  As Seidler (2010:11) puts it, in Tswana tradition, no chief 
was above the law. In theory, there was no distinction between chief and commoner 
before the law. However, in practice, offences by the chief and those close to him 
were treated far more lightly than those by ordinary Tswana commoners. 
 By 1950, British had intensified control over Botswana consequently 
subordinating the country’s interests to those of South Africa. It must be borne in 
mind that control was established far earlier than 1950, and likewise Bechuanaland’s 
interests had long been subordinated to those of South Africa, for example through the 
migrant labour system. Subordination of Tswana people was also revealed through the 
banning of the heir to the Ngwato chieftainship, Seretse Khama in 1948. According to 
Karlin (2010:57) the ban was intended to appease the South African apartheid 
government, which objected Khama’s marriage to a British woman. Khama was 
exiled to England in 1950 by the British government. This infuriated Khama’s 
followers who began to organise a political movement for independence to contest 
British rule (Seidler, 2010).    
 Khama had a massive support from the people of Bechuanaland and this 
played a very crucial role in the process leading to the demarcation of Bechuanaland 
and South Africa. McKenna (2011:88) remarks, “It became clear that Bechuanaland 
could no longer be handed over to South Africa and had to be developed toward 
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political and economic self-sufficiency”. Initially the British government had planned 
to annex Botswana to South Africa in the bid to expand its control in Southern Africa. 
Besides promising protection to Bechuanaland, the British had no real interest in 
actively managing Bechuanaland as the colonial masters thought that Bechuanaland 
lacked valuable natural resources (Seidler, 2010).  
In 1956, the British government allowed Khama to return to Botswana after 
renouncing his claim to chieftainship. According to Alfaro, Spar and Allibhoy (2005) 
when Khama relinquished his chieftaincy title, the British thought that they had 
limited his powers. However, after his return, Khama spearheaded an immense 
political and constitutional transformation. “He travelled the country from village to 
village, working to rally the support of each tribe and chief for the creation of an 
independent nation” (Alfaro et al., 2005:4). Then, in 1962 Khama played a crucial 
role in the formation of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, the current Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP). The establishment of the BDP took place just two years 
subsequent to the formation of the Bechuanaland People’s Party (later the Botswana 
People’s Party-BPP). Although both the BPP and BDP had a similar goal of 
independence, the former did not amass a large following like the latter. BPP 
appealed to urban groups and workers, which Acemoglu et al., (2001) perceive as a 
narrow political base. In contrast, the BDP followed a sound party programme that 
appealed to all politically important groups in the newly founded Botswana: the 
educated elite, the traditional authorities, the cattle farmers, and the rural population 
(Hjort, 2009:691; von Soest 2009:18). The party integrated not only emerging 
educated elite but also the commoners and traditional rulers equally (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Beaulier and Subrick 2006).  
 Beaulier and Subrick (2006) observes that, unlike the BPP, the Khama-led 
BDP brought together a more powerful coalition.  The political strength of the BDP 
coalition emanated from the accommodation of traditional rural structures of loyalty 
between commoners and chiefs. This structure of traditional loyalty, as Acemoglu et 
al. (2001:15) explain, was cemented by the continuation of clientelistic practices such 
as the lending of cattle, known as the mafisa system. Nonetheless, as political parties 
mushroomed, Britain began to lose control of the protectorate and acceded to the 
demands of making Botswana an independent country. After long resistance to 
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constitutional change, Britain finally recognised Botswana’s national independence 
culminating in the protectorate’s first elections in March of 1965 (McKenna, 2011; 
Alfaro et al., 2005). The BDP, led by Khama and his colleague, Ketumile Masire, 
won a handsome victory, and in 1966 the country became the Republic of Botswana, 
with Seretse Khama as its first president (Alfaro et a.l., 2005:4; Robinson and 
Parsons, 2006:116). After independence, the new BDP government did not abolish the 
traditional political system (Somolokae, 1998). Tswana cultural norms (in fact 
informal institutions), which had been adapted under British rule, were now integrated 
into the modern state of Botswana (Seidler, 2010). This provided a strong foundation 
of equitable democratic participation, achieving a delicate balance between traditional 
rule and modern centralised democracy (McLoughlin, 2014:85).  
The BDP based its administrative system on the traditional political structure 
of chiefdoms. Nonetheless, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argues that President Khama’s 
government gave the chiefs no real power over legislation. “Once in power the BDP 
passed legislation that progressively stripped the chiefs of their residual powers” 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001:16). This essentially suggests that, although the post-colonial 
government relied upon the traditional Tswana political system, chiefs were, no 
longer entrusted with the expansive power and authority they had during colonialism. 
During the colonial period, chiefs simultaneously executed the roles of the 
government, the courts and the public administration (von Soest, 2009) but these were 
downgraded to the mere offering of advice on cultural and traditional matters.  
For Acemoglu et al., (2001) bestowing the President with the ability to reduce 
the powers of chiefs was necessary. They argue that the promulgation of the 
chieftaincy Act of 1965 and the Chieftaincy Amendment Act of 1970, which 
progressively stripped the chiefs of their residual powers, was crucial in the 
construction of the modern state (Acemoglu et al., 2001:16). Even so, the regime that 
evolved after independence respected the rule of law and property rights which 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) perceive as the hallmarks of economic prosperity. Thus 
Nsereko (2011:20) asserts, “In a polity governed by the rule of law all government 
actions and decisions are based on and justifiable under pre-determined rules of law. 
Everyone in the country from the president to the humblest citizen is subject to the 
same rule of law without distinction of any kind”.  Historical evidence suggests that 
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Botswana respected and enforced the rule of law (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Since 
independence, the country’s judiciary has been relatively independent.  
Botswana’s political and economic success can also be traced to the 
indigenous institutions that promoted property rights. After independence, cattle 
owners were the politically influential group. This group comprised Tswana chiefs 
and political elites. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001:22) close connection between 
the cattle owners and the BDP played a key role in Botswana’s development. The 
political elites, who happened to be economic elites as well, gave strong support to 
property rights. Nonetheless, security and governance of property rights was kept in 
check by the political institutions inherited from pre-colonial period. As Acemoglu et 
al. (2001:23) posit, political institutions such as the kgotla, ensured a certain degree of 
accountability of political elites. The continuance of these institutions has been 
attributed to the country’s efficient law system that provides for transparency and 
keeps corruption relatively low (Seidler, 2010). Additionally, Robinson (2009) 
pinpoints the success of institutional constraints on the country’s leadership. 
Botswana’s system of placing checks and balances on political elites has been crucial 
in the development of good governance.  
Other analysts have extolled the quality of leadership as another key factor in 
the achievement of good governance in Botswana. Cook and Sarkin (2010:476) 
declare that Botswana has had commendable leaders. The first two leaders of 
Botswana after independence, Seretse Khama and Ouett Masire have been praised for 
being pragmatic, competent and uncorrupt (Robinson, 2009). According to Maipose 
(2008) during his tenure, Khama exhibited disciplined political leadership that 
enhanced public accountability. “Khama’s focus on accountability and political 
consultation, his push to de-racialise the political system, his responsible fiscal policy, 
and his contingency planning are all achievements emblematic of his successful and 
popular leadership” (Cook and Sarkin, 2010:465). Robinson (2009) and von Soest 
(2009) ascribe Khama’s outstanding leadership to his inherited position as a chief of 
the largest Tswana tribe, Bangwato. “Many rural Batswana perceived his presidency 
as the continuation of chieftaincy and in turn, as a permanent rather than an elected 
office (von Soest, 2009:12).   
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When Khama ascended to power in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest 
countries in the world (Hjort, 2009; Somolokae, 1998; Robinson, 2009 and Maipose 
2008). According to Robinson (2009) there were practically no surfaced roads and 
only two secondary schools in the entire country which dated only from the 1940. The 
country’s un-development was a consequence of the acute neglect it suffered under its 
protectorate status. The British’s benign neglect of Botswana, finds roots in the fact 
that Bechuanaland Protectorate was going to be incorporated into South Africa at 
some later date. In 1910, the British signed the Customs Union Agreement with South 
Africa in anticipation to incorporate Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland territories 
(Spencer, 1968). Nonetheless, Geldenhuys (1981) observes that Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland showed no interest in joining post-apartheid South Africa either as a 
federal or unitary arrangement. Batswana chiefs rejected the incorporation arguing 
that, South Africa was an unpleasant place for the Africans especially those who were 
not yet part of it (Matlosa, 1999). Furthermore, Matlosa (1999) states that apartheid 
government undermined the powers of the chiefs in Botswana Lesotho and 
Swaziland. This was demonstrated by lack of consultation with the populace 
regarding incorporation of their territories into South Africa. It is in against this 
backdrop that Somolokae (1998) concludes that colonialism was never about 
development of local people but the expansion of colonial empire. 
1.7.  Economic and Diamond Development 	  
For its first five years of political independence, Botswana remained financially 
dependent on Britain to cover the full cost of administration and development 
(Robinson and Parsons, 2006:116). Upon the realisation that the country was one of 
the poorest countries in the world, Botswana’s leaders particularly the first president, 
acted strategically and engaged in a conscious effort to project the country into a 
liberal political and economic model (Maipose, 2008). Owing to the prudence of 
President Khama, Botswana was able to do away with British grants by 1972 
(Beaulier and Subrick, 2006). At independence the only real prospect for a sector of 
the economy to develop was ranching and this was done successfully by exploiting 
the European Economic Community (EEC) market (Acemoglu et al., 2001:22). By 
the end of the 1960s, the cattle economy had expanded rapidly and other economic 
development programmes that began in the mid-1960s were successful (Hjort, 2009).  
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Thereafter, however, the discovery of diamonds in the late 1960s 
transformed the poverty stricken country into an upper middle income one 
(Maundeni, Mpabanga, Mfundisi and Sebudubudu, 2007). By early 1970s the 
revenues from the newly discovered diamond deposits started flowing and what the 
country’s leadership did in respect of minerals discovery was phenomenal and 
remains admirable to date.  The main diamond mines were discovered in the lands of 
the Bangwato, of whom Seretse Khama was the chief but he transferred the property 
rights over diamonds away from his own tribe to the government (Acemoglu et al., 
2001).  
In 1967, Khama’s government passed the Mines and Minerals Act concerning 
mineral exploitation. Before this legislation, mineral rights were accrued to the tribes 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001) but Khama chose to direct mineral wealth to national 
purposes instead of favouring his home tribe. Khama’s decisive and pragmatic 
leadership coupled with good economic policies played a crucial role in avoidance of 
the natural resource curse. According to (Seidler) 2010 adoption of good policies 
helped Botswana to prevent its resource boom from turning into a disaster. In contrast 
to what occurred in numerous other African countries, the critical factor in Botswana 
was the prudent handling of the country’s natural wealth (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2014). The government’s prudent management of mining revenues precipitated 
investment in public goods and human capital (Robinson, 2009). Good presidential 
leadership by Khama and Masire was undoubtedly a significant element of this 
success (Beaulier and Subrick 2006). “By 1976, the government was running 
persistent surpluses, and Botswana had left monetary union with South Africa to 
establish its own currency and central bank” (von Soest, 2009:9). An almost overly 
cautious budget policy (and spending problems) regularly led to budget surpluses, 
while the country’s infrastructure and educational facilities have been expanded 
systematically (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014).  
Botswana’s diamonds have played a very significant role in the country’s 
economic growth. Its economic performance has flourished and surpassed that of 
virtually all other economies on the African continent. Unlike other African countries 
with abundant natural resources such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
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Sierra Leone and Nigeria, there have been no civil wars or intense infighting to 
control diamond revenues (Acemoglu et al., 2001:4). As such revenues from 
diamonds have grown progressively, allowing the central government to support 
various development activities at national and local levels. There have been low 
inflation, no unsustainable fiscal deficits, a stable currency and secure property rights 
(Seidler, 2010:3). Over the years, Botswana has grown into a relatively prosperous 
nation, despite its over-reliance on diamonds and failure to diversify its economy 
(Maundeni et al., 2007). Although a number of countries have achieved rapid 
economic growth for a decade or two, few have been able to sustain it for as long as 
Botswana (Cook and Sarkin, 2010).  There is almost complete agreement that 
Botswana has enjoyed much success because of its good economic policies and 
disciplined political leaders who managed to limit corruption and most importantly 
enhance public accountability (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Maipose, 2008; Cook and 
Sarkin, 2010; Robinson 2009; Beaulier and Subrick, 2006). As Cook and Sarkin 
(2010:465) observed, “the combination of positive economic and political factors has 
led to endless references to Botswana as Africa’s “Miracle,” not just by a handful of 
academics, but by the media and many others”. In the 45 years of Botswana’s 
independence, the country has made commendable strides in maintaining solidarity 
and unity among its citizens (Alexander and Kaboyakgosi, 2012). 
However, the events of the 2011 public service strike have ostensibly masked 
the positive evaluation that Botswana is Africa’s economic miracle and a shining 
example of democracy. As it will be shown by the findings of this study, the current 
leadership has failed to preserve the exemplary governance and human rights record. 
The findings of this study will demonstrates that, unlike his predecessors, President 
Ian Khama cannot boast a government with a reputation of prudent management of 
the country’s resources or even a good governance record and stable democracy. As 
will be indicated by the findings of this study, current leadership does not have the 
economic well-being of the working class at heart. “Since the succession of 
Lieutenant-General Ian Khama to the presidency in April 2008, there has been an 
escalation in the militarisation and personalisation of power in Botswana. As a result, 
democracy and governance have been seriously undermined in what has generally 
been portrayed as an African success story” (Good, 2009:315). 
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1.8. Botswana’s authoritarianism disguised under the veneer of liberal        
democracy 	  
Botswana’s democracy is rooted in the country’s traditional political economy of 
patron-client culture, known as mafisa, and its associated political system of 
chieftaincy (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2008). In this system, cattle owners and water 
point owners, mostly members of the royal family, were the pillars of the political 
culture and since independence have wielded huge influence over rural voting 
patterns (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2008). These patrons have had power over their 
subjects; they have given them instructions on who to vote for, a capacity reflecting 
the face that polling stations are often located on private farms and ranches where a 
significant number of the voters are employees of one large patron (Sebudubudu and 
Molutsi, 2008:50). This system has helped to facilitate the political dominance of a 
single ethnic group and subsequently single political party.     
During the colonial period, cattle owners were mostly chiefs from the Ngwato 
tribe. Ownership of cattle was a sign of wealth, and therefore the most important 
occupation for the Tswana aristocracy who mostly were members of the ruling BDP 
(Parsons, 1999).  In Tswana culture it is often assumed that chieftainship is neither 
dictatorial nor autocratic, but mitigated by democratic practices (Maundeni 2008). 
However, in the past, chiefs were not nominated or elected by popular consent, but 
acceded to power under the mantra that kgosi ke kgosi ka a tswetswe, which translates 
a chief is a chief by right of birth (Mgadla, 1998: 3). In short, Tswana leadership was 
hereditary and reserved for a male heir (Maundeni 2008). 
 According to Parsons (1999), the culture of male primogeniture shaped the 
nature of local administration in colonial society, thereby entrenching the rules of 
succession. Crowder, Parsons and Parsons (1990:3) assert, “In Tswana states during 
the colonial era, there was a strong sense of legitimacy and acceptance of given rules 
for succession”. Furthermore, Maundeni (2008) points out that the principle of 
legitimacy based on male primogeniture set limits on contestation for political office 
even among the royal brothers and cousins. This principle also limited competitive 
politics, as well creating stability within the Tswana political system. For example 
when Seretse Khama’s father died, Khama was only four years old and was 
proclaimed as the rightful ruler of the Bangwato people. However, because he was not 
Page 18 of 112	  
yet of age, his uncle, Tshekedi, became regent until Seretse had grown up and was 
ready to lead the Ngwato ethnic group (Parsons, Henderson and Tlou, 1995). In this 
regard, Maundeni (2008:82) argues, “Tswana constitutionalism was designed to limit 
contestation and to prevent sustained political competition”.  
It is against this background that any form of opposition to the ruling party has 
never been taken well in Botswana. The Tswana political system has to some extent 
inculcated a sense irrational reverence and subordination for those in power. Crowder, 
Parsons and Parsons, (1990:10) argue, “The Tswana constitution was undemocratic in 
the liberal-democratic sense of today. Legitimate succession to high office was 
dependent upon birth. Large segments of the population were excluded by birth both 
from any part in succession as well as normal politics”. This strengthened the BDP 
sovereignty as its large following was from the Ngwato tribe. Bangwato chiefs had 
been leaders of the Tswana people throughout colonial period because of their power 
and status (Lange, 2009:157). Violation of Batswana’s political rights continued even 
after the political system had changed in 1966, when the process of creating a 
supreme leadership by birth was replaced by the process of creating it by elected 
representatives (Maundeni, 2008).   
In the current system, the president has more power and authority than 
parliament and the country's parliamentary system does not ensure and facilitate 
broad-based and inclusive political participation in the decision-making process 
(Mogalakwe, 2003). Even though Botswana does not have a directly elected 
president, huge power is centralised in his hands (Good and Taylor 2006). The 
president commands extensive executive powers in terms of the constitution and other 
laws (Sebudubudu, 2010). This, according to Mogalakwe (2003), resembles the 
political power relations and governance systems of the past Tswana political system. 
Maundeni (2008) continues that, in both the traditional Tswana and the modern 
political systems, the population has been reduced to the role of spectators with 
regards the selection of the president. It is for this reason that even when the 
government explicitly violates workers’ rights, much cannot be done because power is 
concentrated in the office of the president. For this reason and others, skeptics argue 
that positive reviews of Botswana democracy should be queried.  Good (2005), for 
instance, argues that positive reviews mask the elitist nature Botswana’s democracy.  
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Good (2005:19) asserts, “Democracy in Botswana, is constrained not only at 
key institutional and structural levels, but in the expression of opinion too” as 
evidenced by intimidations and threats directed to vocal unions during the 2011 strike. 
He further insists that human rights issues are a significant threat to Botswana’s 
positive reputation, reflecting growing concern that the governance of President Ian 
Khama is despotic. In his critique of Botswana’s democratic credentials, Good (2005) 
highlights how Presidentialism has developed over the years. “Presidentialism 
basically entails the centralisation of power in one office and person, and the 
predominance of a single party” (Good, 2005:1). Since independence in 1966, 
succession to presidential power in Botswana has only occurred within one party, the 
BDP, which has been kept in power by the distortions, produced by the first-past-the-
post election system. This quasi-democratic system was perceived as a norm until the 
late 1990s (Good 2008) when the predominance of the BDP was challenged (Good 
and Taylor, 2006). State power in Botswana is centralised in the office of the 
president. The president is the head of the state, head of government, leader of the 
ruling party and commander-in-chief of the army (Good, 2008:25).   
The office of the president enjoys unlimited access to state resources such as 
electronic media and communications (Good and Taylor, 2006). Furthermore, the 
succession of President Ian Khama to the presidency in 2008 increased the influence 
of security institutions such as the unpopular Directorate of Intelligence and Security 
(DIS), established to combat 'any foreign influenced activity' and 'subversive 
activities from the country's detractors' (Good, 2009). The powers of DIS are 
unlimited and its personnel are appointed on terms and conditions chosen by the 
president. The intelligence agency was established under the pretext that it would help 
the president to execute his presidential job more effectively (Gwatiwa, 2011).  
However, the agency has rather turned out to be providing clandestine services to the 
president.  
There have been reports of communication surveillance instigated towards 
politicians who seem to be a threat to the presidency: whether from the ruling party or 
opposition. It mattered less whether this perceived threat was of national security or 
towards the Khama personality cult, public extra-judicial killings in operations 
overseen and coordinated by the DIS have become commonality, engendering 
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escalation of terror and fear in the public realm (Gwatiwa, 2011). Sharing the same 
sentiments with Good (2009), Gwatiwa (2011) concurs that Botswana is experiencing 
a new surge of state terrorism thriving closely identified with President Khama. The 
president of Botswana is empowered to do as he pleases. The Public Service Act of 
2008 empowers him to make regulations for setting up a 'body' for the purpose of 
'consultation' between the government and members of the public service, this 
essentially placing public service employees at his mercy.  
There is growing unease over the president’s tendency to make unilateral 
decisions without consulting the masses especially the working class. This 
undermines the core principles of democracy. As Maundeni (2008) argues, "Botswana 
cannot be a model of democracy when workers get punished for demanding what is 
theirs,” The country’s industrial relations system has a marked bias in favour of the 
repression of labour. In 2007, the then Minister of Labour and Home Affairs 
portrayed the country’s labour relations as frayed. In accordance with the Minister’s 
observation Marobela (2011) concurs that, Botswana does not have impressive 
industrial relations records. Indeed, it would seem that contravention of Batswana’s 
political rights has now extended to contravention of workers’ industrial rights.  
1.9.  Industrial Relations in Botswana 
Although Botswana is extolled as a liberal democratic country with impressive 
economic growth and political stability, the state of industrial relations in the country 
undermines these claims. In Botswana, the government is the largest employer and the 
most powerful player in industrial relations. Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) 
argue that, the country’s judicial system confers enormous powers in the Office of the 
President making it possible for the government to be the primary actor in industrial 
relations. Botswana government enacts the laws governing the industrial relations 
system.  
Government control of labour relations began to extend markedly from the 
1970s when diamond revenues began to make significant contributions to national 
wealth (Selolwane, 2012:180).  This impacted negatively on the relative freedom that 
trade unions enjoyed such as political participation, independent organisation and 
recruitment of members. There were new sets of laws initiated that gave the 
government control over trade unions and industrial relations thereby hugely 
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curtailing the right to strike (Selolwane, 2012). The new policy measures brought 
collective bargaining under the government supervision and the government decided 
the parameters within which unions could recruit. However, organised labour did not 
conform easily to these new laws and mounted pressure on the government to amend 
them.  The most significant amendments include the 1992 amendments to the Trade 
Union and Employers’ Organisation Act, the Employment Act and the Trade Dispute 
Act, which made commendable attempts to liberalise the industrial relations 
(Selolwane, 2012). 
 In 2008, the Botswana parliament enacted a Public Service Act No.30 
hereinafter the new Public Service Act that superseded the Public Service Act 2008. 
Promulgation of the new Public Service Act was done for the explicit purpose of 
aligning the country’s labour laws with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
standards. The Act consolidated the public service in Botswana from being 
fragmentally regulated by various pieces of statutes into one unified service. The new 
Public Services Act repealed the Public services Act; the Unified Local Government 
Service Act; The Teaching Service Act; and Part II A to Part II F of the Tribal Land 
Act (Public Service Act 2008). However, Motshegwa and Tshukudu (2012) indicate 
that many loopholes were identified in the 2008 Act and within short period during its 
implementation some amendment were made. The other major weakness of the Act is 
the fact that, in its implementation, some unions were excluded as their registration 
was questioned and derecognised, this according to Motshegwa and Tshukudu (2012) 
caused further rift between government and unions. 
Solo (2007) theorised that, when implementing labour laws in Botswana the 
government should reflect on South African labour relations. In South Africa, two 
complementary pieces of legislation were promulgated in line with meeting ILO 
standards. The Labour Relation Act 66 of 1996 (LRA) and the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) are the key statutes introduced in South Africa 
to create a more cooperative industrial relations system (Taylor 2008). By 
implication, promulgation of the LRA and the BCEA has aligned South Africa’s 
labour laws and industrial relations to ILO obligations hence the call for Botswana to 
benchmark from South Africa. Botswana has ratified seven ILO fundamental labour 
standards, which according to Solo (2007) form the integral part of human rights. 
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Some of the core conventions ratified by Botswana are Convention number 87 of 
1948 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention. This Convention, “grants the right to all workers and employers to form 
and join organisations of their own choosing without prior authorisation, and lays 
down a series of guarantees for the free functioning of organisations without 
interference by public authorities” (Solo, 2007: 3 and ILO, 2009:26). 
 
Another key convention is the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention number 98 of 1949. This fundamental convention provides for protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination including protection against unfair dismissal 
of a worker for participating in union activities. The convention also enshrines the 
right to collective bargaining (ILO, 2009:26). One would have thought that 
ratifications of these fundamental conventions would harmonise the country’s 
industrial relations however, the context of Botswana labour relations remains 
intricate owing to issues that arguably revolve around these very core labour 
standards.    
Marobela (2011) observes that some of Botswana labour laws are still falling 
short of meeting the international labour standards hence the country’s difficult labour 
relations. The labour relations system comprises three actors namely; employers, 
workers and their trade unions. The relationship between these three actors in 
Botswana displays a distinctive pluralist approach that recognises conflict as 
inherently part of industrial relations environment. Motshegwa and Tshukudu (2012) 
ascribe conflict to the fact that the Botswana government is the largest employer in 
the public sector. They observe that, this leads to conflict between the employer and 
the unions because the government feels everything in the workplace should be done 
according to its dictates.   
 According to Marobela (2011), the government of Botswana has adopted 
hostile and repressive attitude towards trade unions expressed most outstandingly 
through its labour laws. Although the government of Botswana allows public sector 
workers to form trade unions it still imposes some restrictions on trade union 
freedoms such as the right to strike (Marobela, 2011).While Botswana government 
has made attempts to adhere to a liberal democratic constitution, the country’s labour 
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relations system is still a complex mixture of repression and paternalism (Mogalakwe, 
1994). The government has historically relegated trade unions to the position of junior 
partners in the tripartite relationship thus inevitably creating tension between the 
unions and the government. Mogalakwe (1994) argues that, conflict between the 
government and trade unions should however, be viewed dialectically. Much as the 
state tries to repress, regulate and dominate trade unions, the latter also puts up its 
resistance to such repression and domination (Mogalakwe, 1994). Notwithstanding 
the glowing reviews of being a peaceful country that the world has always admired, 
Botswana in 2011 was literally “up in flames” due to trade union strikes (Motshegwa 
and Tshukudu, 2012:127). The labour movement put an impressive industrial action 
that challenged the government’s domination. Historically, Botswana has had a 
generally weak labour movement and this weakness in trade unions has contributed to 
and reinforced the government’s repressive attitude towards trade unions 
(Mogalakwe, 1994 and Marobela, 2011). Both Marobela (2011) and Mogalakwe 
(1994) concede that government’s repression of trade unions displays an antagonistic 
labour relations system.   
1.10. Historical overview of Trade Unionism in Botswana 	  
The history of trade unionism in Botswana has not been widely published. Much of 
the background is provided by Cooper (1985) and Mogalakwe (1994). The first union 
in Botswana was formed in 1948 in the colonial trading town of Francistown in the 
north east of Botswana (Cooper 1985 and Mogalakwe 1994). “This union, the 
Francistown African Employees’ Union (FAEU), organised among shop assistants, 
garage workers, government manual workers, teachers and the lower ranks of the civil 
service” (Cooper 1985:104). Contrary to this assertion, Mogalakwe (1994) argues that 
FAEU was open to all workers in all manner of employment except public workers. 
In the 1960s, two other two unions were formed: the European Civil Service 
Association formed and the Bechuanaland Protectorate Workers Union (BPWU). 
BPWU and FAEU were locally based unions, the former largely confined to Serowe, 
the capital village of the Ngwato Tribal Reserve and the latter to Francistown in the 
north east of Botswana (Cooper, 1985). Even though they could push for wage 
demands and raise issues around colonial racial practices, these unions were weakly 
organised, dependent on one or two big men on the top and were carefully placed 
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under surveillance by the colonial administration (Cooper, 1985:105). Mogalakwe 
(1994) argues that, trade unions in Botswana were always viewed with suspicion by 
the colonial state, despite their relatively weak political orientation. 
The efforts to form a countrywide trade federation were realised when the 
Bechuanaland Trade Union Congress (BTUC) was established in 1963, the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) having mounted pressure 
on the government to amend its Act with regards to trade union rights. Thereafter, the 
BTUC played a vital role in the formation of the Bechuanaland General Workers’ 
Organisation (BGWO) in 1964 (Mogalakwe, 1994). The 1960s was a very crucial 
period for trade unionism in sub-Saharan Africa and Botswana was no exception. It 
was during this time that the internal petty elites in Botswana and neighbouring 
countries such as Lesotho established themselves both politically and economically. 
The elites received support from the colonial administration and foreign capital in 
general (Cooper 1985:105). In response, unions ended up forming alliances with some 
of the political parties.  
According to Mogalakwe (1994), the trade union movement in Botswana got 
involved in the nationalist politics of the time, the BTUC forming a coalition with the 
Botswana People’s Party (BPP), whilst FAEU and BPWU joined the Botswana 
Democratic Party. A similar pattern occurred in Lesotho where the Basutoland 
Federation of Labour became linked to the Basutoland Congress Party whilst the 
Lesotho Council of Workers coalesced with the Basotho National Party (Cooper 
1985:107). According to Webster (2007), trade union involvement with political 
parties was one of the effective weapons for fighting colonial supremacy. Similarly, 
Beckman and Sachikonye (2010) postulate that engagement in wider social and 
political alliances enabled trade unions to extend their concerns and mandate beyond 
workplace issues and labour-related matters. In essence this means engagement in 
political alliances had some benefits for the unions.   
This claim seems to find favour in the struggle against colonialism in 
Botswana when the BTUC under the umbrella of BPP became very influential and 
challenged the colonial government’s exploitation of herdsmen. During the colonial 
period, Tswana people were divided along lines of class according to those who 
owned cattle and those who did not. Cattle owners were mostly chiefs, supported by 
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colonial authorities. Ownership of cattle was a sign of wealth and increasingly 
became commercialised and mostly concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite. This 
resulted in the great disparities between the cattle aristocrats and those who did not 
have cattle. Ethnic minorities like the Basarwa had no cattle and had to work for the 
aristocrats. According to Moalosi (2007), political elites acted in their own interest to 
ensure that ownership of cattle remained concentrated in the hands of the few. This 
was not taken kindly by the opposition BPP, as it challenged the status quo.  
Cooper (1985:107) observes that the elites of that time, mainly the members 
of the ruling BDP were shaken by the challenge and hence formed the Bechuanaland 
Federation of Labour (BFL) to counter the influence of the BPP-linked BTUC. It has 
followed that, historically, the government of Botswana has always sought to contain 
the emergence of vocal and potentially powerful trade unions. The extensive and tight 
control over the emerging labour movement was first expressed through the 1960s 
labour laws which required compulsory union registration (FES, 2014). Siphambe 
(2007:25) indicates that, in terms of labour laws, Botswana made a deliberate attempt 
to curtail the activity of unions with the presumption that keeping them weak would 
lead to more stable industrial relations with few industrial strikes.    
In the late 1960s, the government employed yet another strategy of 
weakening the then powerful Botswana Manual Workers Union (BMWU). This union 
organised the so-called ‘industrial class’ workers, employees of the government and 
parastatals in Botswana. Werbner (2013) observes that, although the BMWU 
organised mostly uneducated low waged workers, it was the largest and most 
powerful union in Botswana around 2003 and 2005.This posed a threat to the 
government which reacted to the BMWU’s impact by transferring some of its key 
leaders to other parts of the country where their influence would be ineffectual 
(Makgala, 2007:43). Furthermore, there were cases of unfair dismissals of union 
members and this resulted in a strike on the 15th of January 1968. The strike involved 
union branches all over the country (Makgala, 2007). The government’s response to 
this strike exhibited elements of intimidation; there were threats of dismissal of 
workers and forfeiture of gratuity if they did not return to work within the period 
stipulated by the government. Furthermore, workers who were dismissed were 
selectively re-employed, in extreme cases some government departments rejecting the 
Page 26 of 112	  
re-application of workers who participated in the strike. In 1969, following the strike 
by the BMWU, the government amended the constitution to regulate organised labour 
more tightly (Makgala, 2007).  
The Botswana government intensified its actions designed to weaken and 
discourage trade unions. In 1978, there was yet another strike aimed at challenging 
employment relationship in Botswana. “In this strike the copper miners went on an 
illegal strike that challenged the interest of both the state and capital” (Marobela, 
2011:7). Sadly for workers, many of them were dismissed and some imprisoned 
(Marobela, 2011). Cooper (1978) notes that the defeat had in part to do with weak 
union leadership. Historically, Botswana laws have had tight controls over union 
denying them the right to operate freely and strike, although legal, were rendered 
impossible in practice through lengthy bureaucratic procedures (FES, 2014). The 
labour laws in Botswana made a deliberate attempt to curtail the activity of unions. 
Unions were run on a part-time basis with no provisions for collective bargaining. The 
government took the lead in wage setting as part of the income policy (Siphambe, 
2007).  
The Botswana government’s treatment of trade unionism underlines that 
ultimately it is anti-union and consequently anti-strikes. President Khama has on 
numerous occasions demonstrated detestation of trade unions. Under his government, 
trade unions have suffered intimidation and extremely harsh treatment. For example, 
subsequent to the 2011 historic strike, there were instances of harassment and 
intimidation of trade union activists, unilateral withdrawal of benefits that public 
sector trade unions had previously enjoyed and the denial of the right to organise and 
bargain collectively, as exemplified by the government’s refusal to enter into wage 
negotiations (Waldorff, 2012:1). According to Motshwarakgole (2014), these were 
meant to incapacitate the Botswana Federation of Public Unions (BOFEPUSU). 
Motshwarakgole (2014) notes that throughout the strike and long after, President 
Khama vehemently refused to meet with the BOFEPUSU leadership to resolve 
workers’ grievances, consequently severing the already strained the relationship 
between the government and the trade unions. The President’s reaction to the 2011 
strike seems to validate Good’s (2009) allegation that Khama uses techniques and 
capacities of militaristic rule to an exceptional degree. This came out clearly when his 
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government pulled out from Bargaining Council meeting on salary talks and made a 
unilateral antagonistic decision. The government resorted to increasing salaries for 
non-unionised members of the public service, an act that was seen by many as a 
strategy to frustrate trade unions and persuade them to back down on their militancy.  
According to Good (2005), submissiveness to the authority of the ruling elite 
has often been upheld as the desired norm. This is informed by some Tswana 
idiomaticity such as ‘mafoko a kgosi a agelwa mosako’. In Botswana, questioning 
authority constitutes abuse, and consequently the 2011 strike was seemingly an 
indication of being unpatriotic. As Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012:72) posit, one 
would expect industrial actions to be minimal in a country that upholds democracy 
such as Botswana. However, owing to the difficulties that the current leadership has 
subjected the labour movement to, Botswana experienced a historic strike that brought 
about forth and back litigation between the government and public sector unions 
belonging BOFEPUSU over disagreements on the extent and effect of the right to 
strike conferred to public servants. According to Good (2009), democracy in 
Botswana is seriously undermined, even while it is often seen as an African success 
story. Furthermore, Good (2005) argues that Botswana cannot serve as an example for 
Africa unless it confronts its fundamental failures, including its systematic violations 
of both human and labour rights. 
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNMENT-TRADE UNION RELATIONS IN 
AFRICA AND BOTSWANA 
 
2.1. Industrial Relations trends in Africa 	  
Industrial relations systems in Africa have passed through diverse historical phases. 
This is attributed to the fact that various actors within the industrial relations system 
hold contrasting views on what industrial relations means. In trade unions’ 
perspective, industrial relations explains a fair employment relationship wherein 
workers are granted full labour rights and paid better wages. For workers it may refer 
to the achievement of better wages and job security whereas for employers it may be 
seen in the light predictable working hours and cooperation with management to 
realise productivity and subsequently high profits. Nonetheless, colonial industrial 
relations largely implied the struggle for both political freedom and economic 
emancipation against domination by colonial masters. Resistance to colonialism, often 
led by trade unions and their leaders, characterised the African labour relations 
landscape (Gabre-Michael 1994). Building political solidarity via strikes was seen as 
a necessary tool to break the foothold of repression perpetuated by colonialism. In this 
regard, trade unions played the role of a social movement, mobilising workers against 
repressive political regime of that time.  
 
Trade unions have always been in the forefront of both the struggle for 
obtaining basic labour rights and the battle for socio-economic transformation in 
Africa and the world at large. Workers’ unions have been one of the most crucial 
groups forcing authoritarian regimes to liberalise political life in a wide range of 
countries (Kraus 2007:1). Workers’ organisations have always been viewed as a 
potent weapon against violations of workers’ rights. It is for this reason that they 
mostly find themselves at loggerheads with employers and sometimes the 
government. According to Hyman (2001), trade unionism is based on the compromise 
between three models that he terms ‘the eternal triangle’. In the first model trade 
unions are interest organisations with predominantly labour market functions; in the 
second, they are vehicles for raising workers’ status in society more generally and 
thus advancing social justice; in the third model, trade unions are schools of war in the 
struggle between labour and capital (Hyman 2001:1-2). Nonetheless, Burroni, Keune 
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and Meardi (2012) argue that these models are in their pure form unsustainable in the 
long run and therefore trade unionism is based on compromise between the aforesaid 
models. According to Hyman (2010), contemporary trade union identities are shaped 
by the persistent instabilities and tensions in the eternal triangle of class, society and 
market. These instabilities have spawned major challenges for trade unions globally. 
 
Within a pluralistic perspective, trade unions are considered one of the most 
important social movements underpinning democracy. This perspective acknowledges 
the inevitability of conflict in society and assigns great importance to trade unions in 
precipitating satisfactory resolutions for the functioning of national democracy. Trade 
unions have been historically active in broad popular struggles for independence and 
liberation (Beckman and Sachikonye, 2010). They have always been significant 
players in the struggles against unjust political, social and economic transformations 
especially those advancing the neoliberal agenda. For example, in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian Labour Congress was the major engine of protest against adoption of 
structural adjustment policies between 1988 and 1989 (Fayoshin, 1992 in Kraus, 
2007). Trade unions’ primary functions as autonomous organisations are geared 
towards the improvement of the economic welfare of their members (Rakner 
1992:33). However, the realisation of this purpose has and continues to be threatened 
by various stumbling blocks. During colonial period, trade unions were faced with a 
challenge of overthrowing regimes whilst also fighting for unions’ political 
autonomy.  
2.2. Trade Unionism in the colonial age and the challenges thereof 	  
The global labour movement has always been at the forefront of the struggle to create 
and maintain democratic institutions and democratic rule (Jihye-Chun and Williams, 
2013). Throughout colonial epoch, trade unions acted as the bulwarks against 
colonialism where they developed close ties with the national liberation movements 
(Webster, 2007). In Africa, they have been central in destabilising autocracy, 
initiating political liberalisation, triggering political transition and consequently full 
development of democracy through mass protests and strikes (Kraus, 2007). Trade 
unions across the continent offered the most important platform for ordinary people to 
voice their frustrations against dominance and oppression by the colonial 
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governments. The first strike in modem Africa took place in 1874, in Sierra Leone. 
Workers and peasants came together pushing for land, fair wages and independence 
from the oppression of colonial administrators. Prior to arrival of colonial masters, the 
economy was mainly based on agriculture, producing largely for direct consumption 
(Hymer, 1970 in Britwun, 2012). The transformation of agriculture from subsistence 
production to cash crop became prominent after the arrival of Europeans in Africa. 
During this period, African natives were robbed of their land. According to Britwun 
(2012) colonialism exemplifies the main mechanism for introducing the general laws 
of capitalist development into Africa. Colonial rule changed the largely unwaged 
employment forms in most African states with the introduction of formal sector 
employment (Britwun, 2012). Colonialism created a wage labour force by taking 
away land and imposing taxes upon indigenous populations, while offering them low 
wages to buy consumer goods. 
Following the Sierra Leone strike, other African countries also witnessed 
labour conflicts and riots of a similar kind (ILO, 1994). The colonial powers viewed 
these acts as political rebellions and tried to suppress them by force but this was in 
vain as workers across the continent persisted with their demands. The realisation that 
it was not possible to control spontaneous uprisings using force led the colonial 
powers to approve the creation of labour departments and introduced labour 
legislation authorising organisation of trade unions (ILO, 1994:29; Fayoshin, 
1998:31). Nevertheless the new labour laws were just another mechanism of 
controlling workers’ organisations and not granting them the autonomy to protect the 
rights and interests of workers (ILO, 1994:29; Fayoshin, 1998:31).  
Akwetey (1994) and Kraus (2007) posit that, colonial powers in Zambia 
implemented a labour policy that emphasised non-political unionism thus triggering 
intra-union rivalry and divisions. Suppression of trade unions by the colonial powers 
culminated in a number of tribulations such as marginalisation. Marginalisation of 
trade unions was prevalent across the continent as evidenced by the case of Zimbabwe 
where colonial repression bequeathed weak and politically fragmented unions. 
Following the implementation of the first set of labour laws in Zimbabwe, black 
workers were prevented from unionising (Saunders, 2005 in Kraus, 2007). The 
Industrial Conciliation Act 1934, granted only white workers the right to form free 
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trade unions, excluding black from the category of employee (Saunders 2005:159 in 
Kraus 2007). This is akin to apartheid South Africa wherein labour legislation barred 
legal recognition of trade unions with black membership. African labour could not go 
on strike as participation in industrial action could lead workers to be criminally 
prosecuted. According to Grogan (2007), strike actions, which did not comply with 
the old 1956 Labour Relations Act, were termed illegal strikes. Such anti-unionism 
policies hamstrung the efforts to build a strong and coherent labour organisation 
especially in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
Such policies also countered the efforts by the ILO to integrate colonial 
territories into a new general discourse of social rights (Maul 2012). In 1948 and 
1949, the ILO effected Conventions number 87 and 98 on freedom of association and 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, adopted respectively. Enactment of 
these conventions was a way to bestow the autonomy and independence on workers’ 
organisations to enable them to confidently defend the rights of their members.  
However, the resistance by colonial powers proved to be a stumbling block to this. 
Workers remained undeterred, using a variety of means to resist colonial exploitation. 
The most effective tool against exploitative conditions of labour under colonial rule 
was the recourse to strikes (Britwun, 2012). As strikes intensified, the hostility 
towards trade unions by the colonial governments also heightened.  
According to Maul (2012), colonial powers tenaciously restricted provisions 
governing the free activity of trade unions. In essence, freedom of association was 
recognised in principle and not in practice. Nonetheless, “despite all the restrictions 
and control, African trade unions played the leading role in the struggles for 
independence. Many national trade movements defied the bans on political activities 
and their leaders joined, and in many instances assumed leadership positions in 
nationalist organisations” (ILO 1994:29). The expectation everywhere was that 
independence from colonial rule would lead to enhanced freedoms for Africa’s 
working class and its organisations (Sidibié and Venturi, 1994 in Britwun, 2012).   
In order to pave way for the success of achieving independence, trade unions 
had to extend their concerns and mandate beyond labour-related matters to political 
struggle. They consolidated their fight against colonialism, through alliances with 
political parties. These created a political force that hastened the attainment of 
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independence. However, this alliance, arguably also brought new forms of challenges 
to the labour movement. For example the complexity associated with retaining union 
autonomy has been identified as one of the major challenges arising from union-
political involvement. According to Gabre-Michael (1994), soon after independence 
from colonialism, the relationship between trade unions and political parties severed 
as the former started to criticise post-colonial governments for departing from the 
platform on which they had jointly struggled against colonialism (Gabre-Michael, 
1994). Although most African countries started their postcolonial history with a multi-
party system of governance, they gradually gave way to a one-party system which co-
opted trade unions and suppressed them (Gabre-Michael, 1994).  
2.3. Africa’s Trade unions in the Post-Colonial period 	  
The majority of the African states have evolved from pre-colonial tribally based 
societies through colonialism to become independent states. The remarkable role 
played by African trade unions in conquering colonialism has received adequate 
attention in the scholarly literature on organised labour and industrial relations. 
Scholars such as Webster (2007), Sachikonye and Beckman (2001) have eulogised the 
African labour movement for its catalytic role in necessitating political and economic 
transformations. Through relentless efforts of labour movement, a good number of 
colonised states experienced economic liberalisation and formation of multi-party 
system of governance. According to Kester (2007), the attainment of independence 
brought about some fundamental changes to Africa’s industrial relations. There were 
some structural developments within the continent’s labour relations system, the 
principal one being transformation of ownership relations from private to state or 
public. “Many countries saw socialism as a more attractive political and development 
ideology than keeping to the capitalism of the West which had for many years 
enslaved them” (Kester, 2007:4).  
Formation of new types of social relations was salient to pave way for 
emancipation of workers and deepening of democratisation (Kester, 2007).  Many 
post-colonial states did not want to align themselves to either capitalism or 
communism but preferred a system that endorsed traditions of participation and 
democracy. Kester (2007:5) posit that “In many African French-speaking countries 
‘responsible participation’ became the key government slogan and trade unions gave 
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the policy their support”. Meanwhile charismatic leaders such as Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, played prominent roles in introducing 
policies on participation as part of the broader socialist strategies (Kester 2007). After 
achieving independence, governments in many African countries, became the most 
powerful players in industrial relations. They have played and continue to play a 
major role in enactment of laws governing the industrial relations system. As Kester 
(2007) puts it, Africa’s labour relations turns out to be chararacterised by high levels 
of state corporatism. This finds favour in Dzimbiri’s (2008) argument that African 
states are diverse but they all they share several features such as state interventionism 
role in both economic and political domains. 
 According to Glaser (2007), many radical African socialist leaders pursued the 
political and economic unification of the African continent.  However, this fell out of 
favour in the aftermath of the economic crisis in the 1980s, a period termed the ‘lost 
decade for Africa’ (Kester, 2007). During that period, Africa experienced serious 
economic downturn. There was sharp decline in all economic indicators and 
degradations could even be observed in the labour markets. Overwhelmed by their 
incapacity to come up with solutions to the crisis, African leaders resorted to 
dictatorship. Kester (2007) asserts that, military regimes and formation of one-party 
states suppressed democracy. For this reason, the envisioned social justice and 
deepened democracy turned out to be just a fallacy and trade unions became prisoners 
of authoritarian regimes. The political and social arrangements of the colonial age 
were reproduced in new guises. “There was shift from utopia to slogan, from slogan 
to dogma, from dogma to repression and from repression to dictatorship” (Kester, 
2007:7).  
Owing to these developments, the trade union movement found itself in a 
precarious situation. In some African countries, for example Ghana, trade unions were 
sidetracked when governments introduced workers’ councils. Kester (2007) argues 
that workers councils were easier to control than trade unions, therefore their 
introduction may be understood to be another mechanism through which government 
could consolidate its foothold in suppressing unions. Furthermore, the collapse of 
many socialist states arguably compounded the challenges encountered by trade union 
in the post-colonial Africa in that it paved way for the neoliberal agenda that has 
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dominated the continent’s economic and social development ever since (Kester, 
2007). Neoliberalism engendered dire consequences for African labour. According to 
Konings (2011), mass retrenchments of labour in both the private and public sector 
resulted insubstantial losses in trade union membership and trade union revenue. In 
this regard, the pushing of the neoliberal agenda has arguably been one of the 
significant developments that have weakened trade unionism in Africa.  
According to Kester (2007:11) “the economic crisis of the 1980s forced trade 
unions into defensive position as they were forced into a desperate battle to defend at 
least the most basic interests of their member’s: employment and income”. The major 
concern for trade unions was to safeguard their already weak bargaining power from 
being further weakened by neoliberal orthodoxy. Kester (2007:11) explains that 
“many trade unionists are often not familiar with collective bargaining and have no 
trained skills for it”. Therefore, under the unfavourable neoliberal circumstances “the 
first urgent task for the trade union movement was to get collective bargaining 
functioning” (Kester, 2007:11). Fighting for bargaining power was not the only 
concern for trade unions but also fighting for their autonomy against co-option into 
political parties’ structures.  
In many African countries, trade unions were confronted with the dilemma of 
being part of government by virtue of being an ally to the ruling party. This threatened 
union’s autonomy, as they could not openly criticise the government where necessary. 
Nevertheless, Konings (2011) argue that African governments found it hard to control 
trade unions. “Trade unions were able to preserve at least some autonomy, varying on 
a continuum from low (in former African socialist states, including Guinea, Ghana, 
Tanzania, and some Francophone countries like Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Togo), 
to medium (Mali, Senegal and Nigeria), and high (Burkina Faso and Zambia)” 
(Konings, 2011:168). Whether trade unions managed to successfully preserve outright 
autonomy or not, remains debatable. Contrary to Konings (2011), Webster (2007:1) 
observes that, although trade unions have been the most important actors in the 
struggle against colonialism, they often play the role of junior partners to political 
parties, without developing an autonomous social agenda outside and beyond the 
struggle for political independence.  
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For Webster (2007), trade unions in postcolonial Africa rely on their 
alliances with ruling parties in trying to influence public policy. This however, creates 
some formidable challenges for the labour movement. Southall and Webster (2010) 
chronicle the growing tensions between the ruling African National Congress (ANC) 
and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU entered into 
a tripartite alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and ANC in 
1990s (Southall and Webster, 2010). It has been argued that COSATU entered into 
this alliance on terms favourable to the working class (Webster, 2013). In principle, 
COSATU was committing itself to being loyal to the ideologies upon which it was 
founded. Nonetheless, subsequent events overshadowed this commitment. For 
example, during the transition from apartheid, COSATU mobilised mass support for 
ANC’s ascension to power as the incoming democratic political party yet Southall and 
Webster (2010) observe that during that period, COSATU’s position drifted into one 
of subordination. Subsequent to this, COSATU encountered more setbacks that 
threatened its commitment to the ideologies upon which it was founded.  
According to Southall and Webster (2010:140), in the wake of 1994 general 
elections COSATU faced a dilemma: grappling with the tensions between its 
ambitions to enter a constructive partnership on workers’ behalf with a newly elected 
democratic government and the likely tendency of the latter to demand subordination 
of the workers’ interest to the former’s project of national ‘development’. The 
federation’s challenges were compounded by neoliberalism and its stable-mate 
globalisation. Southall and Webster (2010:140) highlight that COSATU was 
confronted with a profound task of holding talks with its ally (the ANC) on the strains 
apparent in relations between labour-backed ruling parties and organised labour in an 
era of globalisation and neo-liberalism. The success of these talks presented the peril 
of making COSATU’s ideologies subservient to ANCs consequently asserting the 
latter’s hegemony.  Furthermore, Southall and Webster (2010) indicate that, as years 
progressed, ANC succeeded in asserting its hegemony within the alliance leaving 
COSATU feeling a great sense of marginalisation over social and economic policy.  
Tensions within the alliance became explicit at the Polokwane conference where the 
coalition spearheaded by COSATU and SACP openly campaigned for the 
replacement of Thabo Mbeki’s leadership with that of Jacob Zuma. COSATU’s 
decision to rebuff Mbeki and support Zuma arguably was an indication of “the trade 
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union movement’s sense of being increasingly marginalised and that it’s concerns-
notably over jobs-had been sidelined in the formation of government’s policy” 
(Southall, et al., 2006:221).  Borrowing Buhlungu’s (2012) words, Thabo Mbeki had 
earned the wrath of the ANC left by implementing the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) policy in the mid-1990s. This policy enshrined the acceptance 
of neoliberal orthodoxy (Kraus 2007) and subordination of the labour movement 
within the alliance. GEAR reinforced the momentousness of large-scale capital and 
financial markets and the inevitability of their prominence above organised labour 
(Southall and Webster, 2010).  
COSATU became the prime vociferous opponent of GEAR but was otherwise 
ignored. The ANC government led by Mbeki defended the enactment of GEAR as 
vital for attaining macroeconomic stability thus rescuing the economy from 
bankruptcy (Southall and Webster, 2010). Zuma’s ascendancy into power therefore 
represented a victory of the left over the neo-liberal element that had been brought 
into existence and led by Mbeki (Buhlungu, 2012). This victory however, did not 
necessarily signify victory over all of COSATU’s challenges. Its alliance with the 
ruling party continues to be marred by difficulties. Pillay (2013) concludes that 
COSATU is faced with a dilemma of either staying in the alliance and fight to 
influence things from within or leave and establish its own party or support a party 
that would promote workers’ interests.    
Webster (2007) and Pillay (2013) argue more broadly that unions in Africa are 
reconsidering their approach to political alliances with ruling parties. According to 
Webster (2007) unions are contemplating relying less on their alliance with the ruling 
parties and focusing on building coalitions with other organisations in civil society, 
such as women’s organisations, organisations of the self-employed, NGOs and 
informal economy organisations. Pillay (2013) on the other hand indicates that; 
COSATU has managed to retain a remarkably high degree of independence within the 
alliance, an action that might be construed as a robust return to social movement 
unionism. Pillay (2013:20) explains, “Social movement unionism has a society focus 
and preserve their independence while engaging in contentious politics within the 
workplace and in broader society and in process forges strong alliance with other 
movements”.    
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To what extent this is attainable, remains a topic of debate. Beckman and 
Sachikonye (2010) have observed that unions which are in alliance with political 
parties are at times caught in the web of partisanship when union leaders either 
support the policies of their immediate party allies or ensure privileged access to 
political power for the leadership itself. As Zikalala (1991) in Buhlungu and Tshoaedi 
(2012) envisioned, when trade unions’ leadership gets involved in party politics it 
becomes difficult for them to fulfill their tasks. He further states, “The overlap of 
leadership also affects the independence of the trade union” (Zikalala, 1991 in 
Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2012:264). Nonetheless those in support of political 
unionism contradict Zikalala’s reasoning. Cronin (1991) in Buhlungu and Tshoaedi 
(2012) argued that, “while there were dangers associated with leaders of unions 
wearing two hats, there were also real benefits to be derived by the organisations 
concerned”. Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2012) are however, adamant that the same 
cannot be said in post-apartheid period as many unionists have realised that they can 
access patronage and power directly as members of the ruling party.  
COSATU has been critiqued for its close association with specific camps in 
the ANC. Webster (2007) argues that this identification has formed some cracks 
within the federation. “Many affiliates are divided into two camps and are unable to 
get on with the core activities of a union because of a breakdown of trust between 
union leaders” (Webster, 2007:5). In this regard one would recognize that, while 
COSATU has been successful in fighting for workers social justice and equality, the 
federation’s political partiality seems to be a hindrance to its realisation of being a 
genuine social movement. COSATU’s political bias sometimes portrays it as what 
Bond metaphorically describes as ‘talk left walk right’. Some of its leaders’ radical 
rhetoric is contrary to their actions. The complexity of unions’ involvement in politics 
comes out clearly when the former find themselves caught between fighting for the 
good cause of the working class versus promoting their political interest and that of 
their allies. In spite of the reviewed challenges, COSATU remains one of the uniquely 
strong labour movements in the continent and calls have been made to labour 
movements in countries like Botswana to benchmark from it and emulate it. 
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2.4. Trade Unionism in contemporary Botswana 	  
In contrast to COSATU, trade unions in Botswana cannot be said to have had a 
significant impact on the national, sub-regional, continental and global agenda (FES, 
2014). Historically, trade unions in Botswana have had a relatively weak political 
orientation. Notwithstanding the strong trade union-political party relations in pre-
independence, in recent times, Botswana trade unions have remained largely ‘passive’ 
in terms of active engagement in the political process (FES, 2014). The weak trade 
union-political party relationship is attributable to both restrictive laws and the 
uncoordinated strategy of how trade unions have responded in dealing with political 
parties in the context of their definition of engagement in politics (FES, 2014).  
Since the colonial age, Botswana government has had strict and unfairly 
prejudiced laws against trade unions. For example the Trade Dispute Act has some 
clauses that give powers to the employer to demand withdrawal of registration of a 
trade union if need be (Marobela, 2011). Such anti-union laws perpetuate hostility 
against unionism in the country. The current leadership has made intentional and 
calculated attempts to curtail the political involvement of public sector unions, a move 
that arguably advance the wishes of the previous leadership. It appears the leadership 
in Botswana disregards Scherrer and Hachmann’s (2012:141) advice that “the labour 
movement is bound to become involved in politics because so many aspects of its 
own conditions of action as well as of its members’ lives are shaped by the prevailing 
laws and balance of forces in the political arena”.  
The first president of Botswana, a man whose leadership aptitude has earned 
the country the plaudits for being Africa’s shining example of good governance and 
democracy, opposed unions’ involvement in politics. The president once stated, 
“Union movements must not become agents of political parties. We have not given 
them the freedom to promote the interests of political parties or external powers” 
(Khama, 1972:9). The former president emphasised that trade unions and their 
officials must make contributions pertaining political issues, through government 
communication channels and not by direct involvement in the political arena (Khama, 
1972). The current president has also echoed similar sentiments. President Ian Khama 
has vowed to fight public sector trade unions alliance with political parties especially 
opposition parties. Khama claims that unions destroy the country by participating in 
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politics. The militaristic leader did not mince words when expressing displeasure 
about trade unions’ intent to join in politics. He argued that unions’ aspiration to get 
involved in politics shows that they have taken war to the government but as a trained 
soldier, Khama bragged, “if they fight me I will also retaliate” (Rantsimako, 2013).
 Owing to such hostilities, it is without doubt that political unionism cannot 
thrive in the current Botswana political terrain. Although political unionism has 
proven, in other African countries like South Africa, to be a potent political force 
capable of influencing labour policies, the intricacy of Botswana labour relations 
makes it an unviable option. In this regard one subscribes to Mogalakwe’s (1994) 
recommendation of social movement unionism, rather than blatant political unionism. 
According to Mogalakwe (1994) social movement unionism stands a better chance to 
flourish since it does not split the ranks of workers along party lines. Besides the party 
split argument, political unionism is also not ideal primarily because the government 
of Botswana has historically detested it and has employed all possible mechanisms to 
ensure its failure.  
 
Subsequent to the 2011 strike, BOFEPUSU officials were detained for 
allegedly “uttering political statements” (Motshegwa and Tshukudu, 2012). This is 
because “during and after the 2011 public sector strike, trade union leaders from 
BOFEPUSU rallied around the issue of ‘regime change’ and pledged support for a 
united opposition in by-elections and, importantly, the 2014 general elections” (FES, 
2014:12). It must however be borne in mind that because this decision was endorsed 
by a small minority of BOFEPUSU members, it created conflict within the federation. 
“Effectively, their argument was that such a pronouncement had not been deliberated 
and endorsed by membership through the relevant union structures such as the 
Delegates Congress” (FES, 2014). As Gabonthone (2009) posits, the implications of 
these union responses have unfortunately manifested in strong anti-union sentiments 
in national political culture. Unlike COSATU, trade union federations in Botswana 
are not yet politically developed to have any political influence especially in 
government policies. This is one of the reasons why the government feels absolutely 
not obliged to advance the interests of labour.  
 
Dipholo (2010) argues that owing to their lack of political muscle, the 
government will never recognise Botswana trade unions as significant social forces 
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and will continue to treat them with contempt. On a whole, the relationship between 
Botswana government and trade unions is akin to that of a “master-servant”, one in 
which the state dominates and trade unions are relegated to a lesser partner in the 
employment relationship (FES, 2014). In other words, the government of Botswana 
has adopted a unitaristic type of labour relations. Therefore, in order to successfully 
fight government structures of social domination, Botswana labour movement will 
first have to do away with internal feuds. Motshegwa and Tshukudu, (2012:121) warn 
that, internal feuds stifle the growth of unions as institutions, policy advocates and 
general social activists and subsequently leave them fragmented.  In 2007, there was 
an incapacitating split within the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) 
formed in 1977 with governmental “assistance” (Motshegwa and Tshukudu, 2012). 
Prior to this split, there was another one in 1988, which revolved around issues of the 
BFTU’s political affiliation. According to Motshegwa and Tshukudu (2012) the main 
reasons for the breakaway were disagreements on whether BFTU affiliates should be 
aligned to political parties or should they be neutral and only have political affiliation 
on an individual basis.  
 
The ruling BDP, under whose government the BFTU was formed, was 
implicated as one of those fueling dissent in the perceived opposition parties who 
were sympathetic to the union movement (Motshegwa and Tshukudu, 2012:122). The 
internal feuds with the federation gave leverage to the government’s abuse and 
repression thus further weakening the already weak Botswana labour movement.  The 
2007 split dealt a severe blow to the BFTU, whose membership was reduced by more 
than half, leading to the formation of a splinter federation called Botswana Federation 
of Public Service Unions (BOFEPUSU). This federation comprise the five big public 
sector unions (dubbed ‘the big five’), namely; Botswana Public Employees’ Union 
(BOPEU), National Amalgamated Local Central Government and Parastatal Workers’ 
Union (NALCGPWU), formerly known as Botswana Manual Workers’ Union 
(BMWU), Botswana Teachers’ Union (BTU), Botswana Sector of Educators’ Union 
(BOSETU) and Botswana Land Boards, Local Authorities and Health Workers 
Union’ (BLLAHWU).  
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Besides political disagreements, the demise of BFTU has also been located in 
the federation’s ineffectiveness emanating from the ruling BDP’s persuasive rhetoric 
whose emphasis is upon ‘building a united nation’ through ‘peace and stability’ (FES, 
2008). The submissiveness of BFTU has earned it a satirically label of a ‘sweetheart’ 
organisation rather than an aggressive one. The federation is criticised for lacking 
technical and professional acumen and hence having made no tangible influence on 
regional and international policy issues (FES, 2014). BFTU’s failure to bring about 
major improvements in the working class and the Botswana society added to the 
already existing problems that have given leverage to the success of the rival 
federation, BOFEPUSU.  
The splinter federation has made significant strides in its ability to threaten 
BFTU. Although BOFEPUSU organises only public sector workers, whilst BFTU 
organises those in both the private and public sectors, the former has made efforts to 
achieve a breakthrough in its international relations on a sub-regional and continental 
level (FES, 2014). According to Moupo (2011), The formation of BOFEPUSU 
uniting within its ranks, the bigger and much better organised NALCGPWU, with a 
proud history of militant struggle spanning over 40 years, did much to infuse the new 
federation with an impressive working class militancy and combativity. BOFEPUSU 
made its existence felt in 2010 when it threatened to go on strike, demanding that the 
22 days working month agreed and signed to by the employer should be paid effective 
from May. “The government acted fast to stop the strike by agreeing that they will 
pay public servants effective from May 2010 arrears amounting to more than P6 
billion”. The Public Service Act was also amended to incorporate the 22 number of 
working days for public servants but this created a big problem for government as it 
appears as if that section of the Act was not thoroughly thought through (Motshegwa 
and Tshukudu, 2012:124).  
However, in 2011 the federation engaged in a historic debilitating strike 
comprising 100,000 public-sector workers (Throup, 2011). This strike, which 
included teachers, hospital doctors, nurses and support staff, civil servants, and fire 
fighters, brought the public sector to a standstill.  
 
Page 42 of 112	  
2.5. The historic 2011 public sector strike and the resultant conflict 	  
Strikes are an integral weapon used by workers worldwide to get employers to attend 
to their grievances. The right to strike is one of the fundamental rights affirmed by the 
ILO. Although neither of the ILO conventions on freedom of association (no.87) and 
on right to organise and collective bargaining (no.98), expressly refer to the right to 
strike, ILO organs have frequently held that the right to strike is one of the essential 
means available to workers and their organisations for the promotion and protection 
of their economic and social interests (Joyner, 2001:217). The Botswana legislation 
recognises workers’ right to strike but the procedures required to have a legal strike 
are severely restrictive. The government has supposedly sought to align the country’s 
labour laws with the ILO standards yet the procedures for strikes remain unworkable. 
Therefore, as Marobela (2011) argues, the revised Act allows unions to organise for 
strikes in theory and not in practice. The action of the state towards workers’ rights is 
contrary to the country’s legal framework implying that there is a paradox existing 
between policy and practice in Botswana. This paradox played out in the events 
surrounding the historic public sector strike of 2011.  
 
For the first time in history, Botswana witnessed a debilitating public servants’ 
strike, which spanned a period of almost two months and was dubbed the ‘mother of 
all strikes’ (Motshegwa and Tshukudu 2012; Werbner, 2014). Due to the fragmented 
regulation of the public service prior to the enactment of the new Public Services Act, 
which was implemented on the 1st April 2010, there had been isolated pockets of civil 
servant strikes previously. The majority of such strikes were mostly declared and/or 
viewed as illegal and unprotected, as the then laws were extremely rigid, making it 
near impossible for public servants to have a legal strike. Prior to 2010, the existing 
laws prohibited the engaging in industrial action by public servants with the exception 
of an industrial class cadre (Solo, 2007). The 2008 Act has since changed the labour 
relations landscape in Botswana by legalising the right to strike in different sectors 
including public and mining sector. As a result of conferring the right to engage in 
industrial action accruing from the new Public Service Act, Botswana witnessed a 
dramatic public servants strike.  
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The strike broke out in April 2011 and was the longest and most litigious in 
the country’s history. Public sector workers had not received a wage increase for three 
years and when they demanded for 16% increment, the Botswana government offered 
only 3% increase. Initially the government had offered a 5% increase on the condition 
that the first quarter of the economy shows some improvements. The unions declined 
the conditional offer arguing that it was tantamount to no offer as it lacked the 
bargaining aspect (Tautona Times, 2011). The government argued that a 16% increase 
could not be accommodated because of the economic distress consequential of the 
2008-2009 global recessions that led to a sharp decline in demand for diamonds 
(Throup, 2011). According to Throup (2011) despite the realisation that over- 
dependence on diamonds makes the country vulnerable, the government of Botswana 
has still failed to create microeconomic strategies of economic growth and job 
creation. The sharp decline in demands for diamonds forced the government to cut 
both development and recurrent expenditure. Van Niekerk (2011) argues that the 
government’s decision to cut on expenditures was in line with satisfying the IMF and 
World Bank, both of whom urged Botswana government to reduce public 
expenditures. Prior to the 2011 strike, the IMF cautioned that the civil service was too 
large and that fiscal sustainability requires both reducing the wage bill and reducing 
the number of public sector workers (Throup, 2011 and Van Niekerk, 2011).  
Unions led by BOFEPUSU, argued that the budget could accommodate their 
wage demands if spending in the budget was reprioritised but the government 
remained uncompromising. Consequently the government acted in bad faith and 
announced the 3% salary increase while negotiations were still on-going and before 
the agreement was signed (Motshegwa and Tshukudu, 2012). Unions lamented that 
the 3% increase did not add much value as it only managed to move employees to a 
different tax bracket whilst leaving some workers worse off. Furthermore, Moupo 
(2011) argued that, a 3% offer was a clear indication of the state’s utter contempt for 
the workers plight. According to Moore (2014), Botswana as a capitalist country not 
only pays workers the barest minimum wage but also keeps driving wages down. It is 
argued that the government does not only exploit workers but also represses them 
through various mechanisms such as the law. 
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In addition to unilaterally making a decision of 3% final offer, the 
government ordered workers from electrical, fire, health, sewerage, water and 
transport and telecommunication services to return to work with immediate effect 
arguing that they belonged to essential services and were legally forbidden from going 
on strike. The government threatened that if these workers did not take heed of this 
order they would be dismissed. The majority of workers from these services remained 
undeterred by the threat and were subsequently dismissed. According to Tautona 
Times (2011), the total number of employees dismissed was 2, 460. These included, 
but not limited to, 1, 850 dismissed employees from the Ministry of Health; 58 
employees from the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources; 252 from 
local authorities, being employees from fire, sewerage and electrical services; 174 
employees from the Ministry of Infrastructure, Science and Technology; and 38 
civilian personnel from the Botswana Defence Force. The government also imposed a 
no work no pay rule on the strikers. Critics of President Khama argued that these 
intimidation tactics were intended to force workers to concede defeat. Nonetheless, 
workers defied the government and blatantly disregarded its intimidation, threats and 
outright repression (Moupo, 2011).  
Subsequent to the dismissals of essential services workers, unions held talks 
with the government, where they expressed their willingness to accept the 3% offer 
provided the offer was distributed across the pay structure in a pyramid form; 
dismissed employees in essential services were reinstated and the ‘no work no pay 
rule’ was annulled (Tautona Times, 2011). The government refused to reinstate the 
sacked workers and to withdraw the ‘no work no pay’ clause. Ultimately, negotiations 
collapsed and violence escalated. Heavy security (armed police, paramilitary Special 
Support group and the helicopter was deployed to prevent the striking workers from 
engaging in acts of violence and destruction that had accompanied the strike 
(Motshegwa and Tshukudu, 2012).  The presence of the security forces intimidated 
strikers to suspend the strike. Some trade union leaders were even arrested for 
allegedly urging strikers to throw Molotov cocktails at the police (Throup, 2011).  
 
The government’s intolerant and insensitive response to the strike raised 
many eyebrows. Some clergymen from the country’s big religious denominations 
who viewed the strike as a national crisis, pleaded with President Khama to reconvene 
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Parliament, which he had prorogued two days before the strike began but the request 
fell on deaf ears. Instead the president chose to address the strike in rural kgotla 
meetings hardly attended by any worker, where he trivialised the workers case, 
portraying them as selfish people who in demanding a salaries increase, were seeking 
to appropriate an exorbitant share of the national income (Moupo, 2011). Werbner 
(2013) observes that in the early years after independence the demand for workers’ 
rights in Botswana was construed as unpatriotic.    
The government has often used propaganda about nationalism to discourage 
workers from lobbying for their rights. The president’s response to the 2011 strike 
laid bare Good’s (2008) remark that he is more of a ‘despotic chief’ than a democratic 
ruler. The government under the patronage of President Khama perpetually 
suppresses trade unions and consequently workers. As Motshegwa and Tshukudu 
(2012:128) argue, “the 2011 strike brought many conflicts and controversies in 
Industrial relations in Botswana”. The education sector under the Ministry of 
Education was the hardest hit of all ministries by the ‘mother of all strikes’. The 
Minister of Labour and Home Affairs in a direct response, promulgated the 
regulations in terms of Trade Disputes Act and classified members of the teaching 
service and few more professionals as “essential services”, thus curtailing their right 
to strike as provided for in terms of the new Public Service Act.   
BOFEPUSU’s constituent unions took the minister to court for an order 
declaring the re-classification of essential services cadres. Judge Justice Dr. O.B.K 
Dingake in Botswana Public Employees Union and Others v Minister of Labour and 
Home Affairs and Another MAHLB-000674-11 declared the Trade Disputes 
(Amendment of Schedule) Order, 2011 contained in Statutory Instrument No. 57 of 
2011 invalid and of no effect. Furthermore, the court declared that Section 49 of the 
Trade Disputes Act 2003 (Act No. 15 of 2004) is incompatible with the Constitution 
of Botswana and accordingly invalid. The government of Botswana appealed the 
ruling of Dr. Dingake to the highest court in the land and the court also declared the 
participation of essential services employees in the 2011 strike as illegal. Following 
this ruling, the government unilaterally employed a statutory instrument to increase 
the list of categories covering essential service employees. Statutory Instrument No. 
49 of 2011 incorporates cadres such as teaching services, diamond sorting, cutting and 
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selling services and veterinary services.  
The sudden amendment of the Trade Disputes Act was arguably meant to 
make it difficult for some employees to engage in strike activities (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung Report 2013). The unions challenged the amendment at the High Court, 
which ruled in their favour and Statutory Instrument No 49 of 2011 was rescinded. 
The government again appealed this High Court decision but lost the case. According 
to Werbner (2014), Batswana are used to ‘living their lives in courts,’ to an extent that 
the belief in the right to go to court and the rightness of going to court to defend one’s 
rights is thus a taken-for-granted for most Batswana. Furthermore, the government in 
Botswana does not hesitate to disregard its own laws and court decisions. Werbner 
(2014) argues that the government’s contempt of court’s ruling makes the law seem 
ineffectual. The futility of Botswana laws seemed most evident during the 2011 strike 
when the government as employer appeared intent on undermining the reforms to 
labour law (Werbner, 2014).  
In Botswana, the president appoints judges and this becomes problematic and 
unfair for trade unions. Section 96(1) and section 100(1) of the Constitution of 
Botswana provides that the President appoints the Chief Justice and the president of 
the Court of Appeal. According to Dithapelo (2013) the President does not have to 
consult anybody in making these appointments. This means that the he can use his 
absolute discretion since the Constitution does not provide for any process of 
consultation (The Law Society of Botswana, 2011). The constitution has vested too 
much power in the president of Botswana such that, as Motshegwa and Bodilenyane 
(2012) argues, the absolute power his government possess, places the unions in a 
subordinate position because government is neither a neutral representative of the 
public or social interest’ nor ‘a captive of class forces, economic forces or the 
capitalist mode of production but rather has some degree of relative autonomy that the 
unions do not have. Hence the unions will always bargain from a disadvantaged 
position (Motshegwa and Bodilenyane, 2012:72).   
Workers in Botswana are granted the right to strike in principle as such the 
tension/conflict between the public-sector unions and the government pertaining to 
the strikes remains high. BOFEPUSU reported the government of Botswana to the 
ILO for its violation of workers’ right to strike. However, the ILO ruling remains 
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indecisive in determining whether Botswana labour laws granting public servants the 
right to strike are in compliance with ILO standards that Botswana committed herself 
to. The flawed Public Service Act further complicates the state of labour relations in 
Botswana. 
According to Mogalakwe, Mfune and Molutsi (2008:551-552) in Botswana, 
neither the Public Service Act nor the country's constitution provides machinery for 
collective bargaining. The Act empowers the President of the country to make 
regulations for setting up a 'body' for the purpose of 'consultation' between the 
government and members of the public service. This is problematised by the 
undemocratic leadership style of Botswana’s President thus causing more harm to the 
already frayed labour relations. This harm, according to Kekgonegile (2012) is huge 
not only to the trade unions but also to the mind-set of all involved in the 
implementation of labour laws. It is argued that President of Botswana is a law unto 
himself and the draconian labour laws that his government has adopted restrain the 
development of trade unions and subsequently curtailing the right to strike. The 
state’s hostility and repression of workers’ rights portrays the government as one 
which has adopted the legal framework because of international pressure.  
The character of the government in its relations with trade unions and 
workers may also be seen to reflect what Michels terms the Iron law of oligarchy. 
This refers to “an organisation which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over 
the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the 
delegators” (Held 2006:135). This generally means that an oligarchic government is 
the one in which power is concentrated in the hands of the few leaders and such 
governments consequently fragment the union grassroots base. Seemingly, Botswana 
government is trying hard to make trade unions virtually powerless through its various 
repressive mechanisms. The state misuses its power to dominate and oppress the 
labour movement in an attempt to annihilate it. Borrowing Marx, line of reasoning, all 
societies are dominated by the ruling class. The government in modern capitalist 
society exists to serve the interest of the ruling class. The capitalist class monopolises 
access to positions of political authority (Fulcher and Scott, 2011). Manipulations and 
pressure are the mechanisms through which the state serves the interest of capitalists. 
Capitalists translate their economic interest into state policies and their power is 
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stronger where its economic dominance is matched by political dominance (Fulcher 
and Scott 2011:794).  
In Botswana, the government relies on the majority of the BDP members it 
obtains in parliament. The BDP has been the ruling party for over forty years and its 
leaders are mostly from the aristocracy established during the colonial period. “The 
Botswana government strongly intervenes in the country's industrial relations system 
and its labour legislation is designed to attract foreign investment and promote 
economic growth” (Mogalakwe et al., 2008:552). In pursuit of attracting foreign 
investors, the government uses state repressive apparatus to dominate workers and 
silence trade unions. The Botswana government views industrial action as a threat to 
development. Strikes are equated to instability and are viewed as threat to foreign 
investment. Therefore, to satisfy foreign investors the government manipulates its 
power and represses the labour movement. 
 
It must be borne in mind, however, that the problematic character of the 
industrial relations system in Botswana is fundamentally due to the historical 
repression of labour which has culminated in the weak movement the country is 
having. External factors such as implementation of neoliberal policies are just 
catalysts exacerbating the already existing problems. The country’s labour relations 
system has always been assumed to be cordial owing to the country’s democratic 
nature. Nonetheless, according to Kaboyakgosi and Marata (2012) while Botswana 
has long enjoyed accolades for having a tranquil labour relations system, the 2011 
brought home an uncomfortable truth. Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) emphasise 
that the industrial action of 2011 by the civil servants and the government responses 
to it invalidates the review that Botswana has had uninterrupted peace and progress in 
virtually all areas of human endeavour. Furthermore, “the industrial relations in 
Botswana have turned to be like that of market individualism because it is 
characterised by weak labour that is subordinate to the employer through the indirect 
control of the politicians” (Motshegwa and Bodilenyane, 2012:72). Kaboyakgosi and 
Marata (2012) indicate that, beneath the stability that the country has enjoyed, there 
have been multiple sources of discontent which cause conflict that in previous years 
was concealed but is now being actively expressed by citizens.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Research Design  
 
Research design is “a strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between 
research questions and the execution or implementation of the research” (Terre 
Blanche, Durrheim and Painter, 2006:34). Research design is very important because 
it clarifies the research methods. “The way in which researchers develop research 
designs is fundamentally affected by whether the research question is descriptive or 
explanatory” (de Vaus, 2001:2). A descriptive question examines what is going on 
whilst an explanatory one investigates why a particular thing happens. This is study is 
based on descriptive inquiry intended to give an account of the labour relations 
system, in Botswana.   
The study followed a post-positivism paradigm based on ontological 
assumptions of interpretivism: that is the epistemology recognises that the researcher 
and what is being researched shapes one another. Therefore a complete separation of 
the researcher and subject is impossible to maintain (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The 
study is by nature exploratory and interpretive and as such it largely used a qualitative 
approach. Babbie and Mouton (2001) postulate that the goal of qualitative research is 
to understand and describe social action. The study sought to understand the character 
of labour relations in Botswana through recorded interviews and consulting written 
documents. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), qualitative researchers use a 
wide range of interpretive methods to understand social phenomena. Therefore, this 
study used both individual in-depth and focus group interview as well as document 
analysis. Before starting the fieldwork the researcher had envisaged conducting three 
focus group interviews to supplement individual interviews; however, the sensitivity 
of the topic disadvantaged the plan and only one focus group interview materialised. 
3.2. Sampling 
This study is based on descriptive and explorative inquiry, providing information on 
perceptions of workers and trade unionists on the character of the labour relations 
system in Botswana. According to Neuman (2000:196), qualitative researchers focus 
less on a sample’s representativeness and more on how the sample illuminates social 
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life. Therefore this study did not focus on statistical representativeness but on 
obtaining findings that will be indicative of the current situation regarding the labour 
relations system in Botswana. The findings of this study cannot be regarded as 
statistically representative but are indicative of the situation in respect to labour 
relations in Botswana. 
The sample was purposefully selected through informal interviews. Neuman 
(2000) and Babbie (2001) observe that, purposeful sampling allows the researcher to 
select the sample with specific purpose in mind using his/her knowledge of the 
population. In this study the specific purpose was to find out the perceptions of 
employees on the character of Botswana’s labour relations system and therefore a 
specific informative population sample was targeted. Purposive sampling method 
allowed the researcher to dig much deeper into the information since the people with 
information were already identified. The sample group comprised dispute resolution 
officers, primary school teachers, nurses, industrial court clerks, ILO officials who 
have worked with both Botswana government and public sector unions, doctors who 
left Botswana after the strike, labour relations officials and leaders from public sector 
unions.  
The study also used snowball-sampling technique to trace additional 
participants. Snowball sampling (also called network, chain referral or reputational 
sampling) is a method for identifying and selecting the cases in a network (Neuman 
2000:199). This method involves identifying research participants by referral from 
others. The secretary general of BLLAHWU, who is also the deputy general secretary 
of BOFEPUSU, recommended the secretary general of the NALCGPWU, who is also 
the labour secretary of BOFEPUSU. Also recommended for interview was the 
secretary general of both BOSETU and BOFEPUSU. These are three of the five main 
public sector unions under the auspices of BOFEPUSU that were actively involved in 
the 2011 strike. Union leaders also helped to identify shop stewards in various 
government departments. Unfortunately the majority of the identified shop stewards 
could not participate in the study due to unworkable procedures that the researcher 
was asked to follow by their superiors at work. 
 The key informants in this study were the ILO Officials who worked with 
Botswana government and public sector unions to try and resolve the prevailing 
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conflict fuelled by the 2011 strike. The other key informants were BOFEPUSU 
officials who provided names of government departments where the researcher could 
find unionised workers. Public service workers, at their discretion, assisted with the 
names of fellow workers who took part in the 2011 strike. Nonetheless most of the 
identified participants were not free to openly discuss the events surrounding the 2011 
strike out of fear of victimisation that many workers experienced following the strike.  
3.3. Data Collection instruments and procedures 
This study used data from various sources such as union handbooks, ILO brochures 
and country reports, court pamphlets, individual face-to-face interviews, Skype 
interviews and a focus group. The research project involved fieldwork that was 
carried out in Pretoria in South Africa as well as Gaborone, Lobatse and Goodhope in 
Botswana. 
3.4  In-depth Interviews 
This study focused on the current labour relations system in Botswana and the central 
question was: does the government of Botswana through its labour relations system 
repress the workers right to strike? In total, sixteen in-depth face to face, and two 
Skype interviews were conducted. One interview was done via email. The initial plan 
was to conduct twenty in-depth interviews but this plan was thwarted by some 
unanticipated problems in the field. On average participants involved in this study 
were mainly men of ages ranging from 36 to 65. Participants’ level of education 
ranged from Diploma to Masters Degree and all of them are employed on full time 
basis. 
In-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted with four ILO officials in 
Pretoria, another informational interview at ILO was done through e-mail. 
Furthermore, individual face to face interviews were conducted with three union 
leaders in Gaborone; two teachers in Lobatse; two nurses in Lobatse; two labour 
relations officials in Goodhope; one labour relations specialist at the University of 
Botswana in Gaborone; two Industrial court personnel in Gaborone and one dispute 
resolution officer at the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs in Gaborone. 
Additionally, two Skype interviews were conducted with doctors who worked in 
Botswana in 2011 but are now based in Namibia and South Africa. The primary role 
of these interviews was to solicit respondents’ views on the character of the labour 
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relations system and the right to unionise and engage in industrial action in the public 
sector. Interviews conducted with industrial court employees were intended to provide 
an insight on the legislative framework and whether it demonstrates government’s 
willingness to grant full labour rights to workers in the public service.  
 
A tape recorder was used, with permission from the participants, during 
some of the interviews. In others, respondents were not comfortable as such the 
researcher had to make shorthand notes of their responses. However, other 
respondents, especially teachers and nurses did not want their interviews recorded 
either in a tape recorder or manually by writing for the reason that it may be easy for 
responses to be traced back to them in case the tape recorder end up in the hands of 
their superiors or even worse, the DIS. Another teacher expressed high degree of 
mistrust on the researcher and as such did not want his responses to be recorded at all. 
To fulfil the ethical requirements of social research, whilst also considering the 
sensitivity of the topic and the timing of data collection, the researcher acceded to the 
demands of the participants and assured them that under no circumstance will the 
researcher attribute some statements to them or even their profession. In order to keep 
a track of non-recorded or written interviews, the researcher reserved a notebook in 
which descriptive accounts of fieldwork activities were recorded.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive information of the people who participated in my 
fieldwork. In particular, in the table are the names, age, gender, organisation and 
occupation of the participants. It is important to note that the names of the participants 
are not the actual names (are representative names) while the rest of the information is 
exact. The use of fictitious names was motivated by the sensitivity of the study and on 
the moral grounds to observe the participants’ demand not to disclose their names. 
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Table 3.1 
Participants’ names 
(NB. All names are 
fictitious) 
Age (years) Gender Organisation Occupation 
1. Grace 29 Female Rolong Landboard Labour Relations 
admin officer 
2. Kutlwano 40 Male Rolong Landboard Internal Auditor  
3. Dan 45 Male University of Botswana Lecturer 
4. Julie Confidential Female ILO Labour Standard 
Specialist 
 
5. Sethunqolo 33 Female ILO Programme Assistant 
 
6. Bobby 50 Male ILO Social Dialogue 
Specialist 
 
7. Maziva 36 Male ILO Programme officer 
8. Phiri 50 Male Vryburg Hospital Senior Medical 
Officer 
9. Moyo 42 Male Oshakati State Hospital  Medical Officer 
10. Shima 48 Male Ministry of labour Dispute Resolution 
Officer 
11. Nani Confidential Male  Industrial Court Court Administator 
12. Andile 36 Male Industrial Court  Executive law 
Secretary 
13. Samuel 65 Male NALCGPWU/BOFEPUSU Labour Secretary  
14. Mothusi 39 Male BLLAHWU/BOFEPUSU Deputy General 
Secretary 
15. Brown 42 Male BOSETU/BOFEPUSU General Secretary 
16. Rauwe 33 Female Lobatse Clinic Nurse 
17. Tebogo 40 Female Lobatse Hospital Nurse 
18. Nakedi 42 Male AB Primary School  Teacher 
19. Nomfundo 37 Female NU Primary School Teacher 
 
 
3.5.  Focus Groups Interviews 
Initially, three sessions of focus group interviews were planned but only one was 
successful. This group included six participants from managerial levels at the Rolong 
Land Board in Goodhope, Botswana. When selecting focus group participants, the 
researcher incorporated Neuman’s (2000) suggestion that participants should be 
sufficiently homogeneous to avoid conflict and occurrence of ‘group think’. The 
researcher facilitated the discussion to curb domination of discussion by some of 
participants. Nonetheless, some participants still flinched from expressing their 
opinions thus giving chance to the vocals one to dominate the discussion. Others were 
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more cautious on what they say lest their colleagues expose their responses to the 
superiors.  This group interview was used to get perceptions and views of ordinary 
workers with regards to the prevailing labour conditions and instances relating and/or 
concerning the historical public sector strike of 2011.  
 
3.6.  Document Analysis  
 
Data collected through interviews has been augmented with analysis from some 
documents. This is consistent with Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000:2) claim that 
“combination of multiple methods, empirical materials and perspectives in a single 
study is best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, and depth to any 
investigation”. The analysis of this study incorporates certain provisions of the Public 
Service Act of 2008 particularly those relating to the right to strike. In addition, 
Botswana public sector unions particularly manuals are also incorporated to give an 
insight on formation of public sector unions and the challenges they have faced since 
formation. The primary documents consulted for this study were newspaper articles 
detailing the 2011 strike and the ILO reference books on conventions ratified by 
Botswana government. There is no much publication on the 2011 strikes and  the eye-
witness accounts of people who experienced the events of 2011 public sector strikes is 
extensively covered by Botswana newspapers.  
3.7.  Data Analysis  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the character of Botswana’s labour 
relations system largely using a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is essential 
for social inquiry. The analysis reports the results in qualitative form. The interviews, 
both individual and focus group, were recorded and transcribed. The report places 
emphasis on the perspectives of the interviewees as such analysis will give 
prominence to text rather than numbers as this is the most important feature of 
qualitative analysis (Bryman, 2012). Furthermore, the study will largely use direct 
responses from the participants in line with inductive analysis. In this form of 
qualitative analysis, themes and categories emerge out of the data collected rather 
than from a pre-determined framework.  According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000) and 
Patton (2002), inductive analysis allows the researcher to uncover common themes 
within the data. Recurring issues raised by the participants will be used as themes and 
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will inform data interpretation. Neuman (2000:148) advises that, it is the researcher’s 
responsibility to interpret data by finding out how the informants see their world, how 
they describe their situation or what it means for them.  
3.8.  Significance of study  
Industrial relations, according to Dunlop (1958: v) defines “the complex interrelations 
among managers, workers and agencies of the governments”. Hyman (1975) locates 
the intricacy of industrial relations in the quest for control of work by different actors 
within the system. Hyman (1975) argues that this quest for control brings workers into 
direct confrontation with the management and considers government and its 
regulatory agencies as mere tools of influential individuals or groups who perpetrate 
their selfish interests. It is against this background that the issues of conflict 
manifested through industrial action are increasingly widespread in a number of 
countries. In Botswana, this conflict was unveiled by the historic 2011 public sector 
strike.  This study endeavours to make contribution to academic assessment on the 
effectiveness of certain provisions of the Botswana Public service Act of 2008 
particularly those relating to the right to organise, associate and bargain collectively 
and importantly to exercise industrial action. The study further seeks to add to the 
body of knowledge on the area of strikes in Botswana.  
 
3.9.  Limitations of the study  
The data collection process became long and tiring and at many a time very 
precarious because of the obstacles I met in Botswana. The principal limitation in this 
study is that the majority of public service workers were not willing to participate in 
interviews out of fear of victimisation. The labour relations system of Botswana, 
following the 2011 strike, has been marred by tension and conflict between public 
sector unions and the government. Many workers are still afraid to voice their 
opinions openly following the government’s controversial decision of dismissing 
thousands of public sector workers arguing that their participation in the strike was 
illegal. One could hear workers in many government institutions telling their 
colleagues who were willing to participate in this study that ‘o tla ikgolega’ a Tswana 
expression directly translating to, you will put yourself in trouble. The fear that many 
potential participants displayed thwarted the efforts to conduct the anticipated three 
focus group interviews. As noted above, in the one that was successfully conducted, 
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participants were very cautious on what they say, others kept on declining to answer 
certain questions referring them to their group mates.   
In other instances, public service workers associated the researcher with the 
ill-famed DIS.  Whenever potential respondents were given an explanation of what 
the research is all about they would ask, “How will we know if you are not working 
for the intelligence security services? If you are not then why do you want to record 
our conversations?” These questions were frequently asked by many of the potential 
participants and even if the researcher produced the student card from the University 
to authenticate her identity, some just remained skeptical and refused to participate.   
The awkward procedure for obtaining permission to access government 
institution was another impediment to this study. Apparently, before one can conduct 
a research in any government establishment in Botswana, the University where he/she 
is studying should write to the Ministry, under which the establishment falls, giving 
details of the research study. This letter will then be taken to the Permanent Secretary 
of that ministry who will either approve or decline the request. The researcher started 
distributing letters from the University of Witwatersrand, requesting for permission to 
access the premises in the month of June, and followed them up through email and 
telephone. One of the letters was submitted to Botswana College of Agriculture, a 
parastatal under the Ministry of Agriculture. Every time the researcher phoned to ask 
if there has been any response from superiors, she was told that the letter is still at the 
Permanent Secretary’s office. From June until September, when the researcher 
returned back to the University of Witwatersrand to resume lectures, the letter was 
still at the Permanent Secretary’s office. Efforts to trace it by phone proved futile.  
  
Collecting data in Botswana was not only expensive, as the researcher had to 
shuttle between South Africa and Botswana, it was also emotionally draining. There 
were moments when interviews had to be conducted under the prying eyes of some 
individuals who believed that the study was politically predisposed. Some participants 
were totally scared away from participating in the study by their superiors. For those 
who chose to defy the intimidations and agreed to talk, the conditions they gave the 
researcher were often unfavourable. For example the two teachers requested that their 
interviews should not be recorded and their school names should not be indicated in 
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the report as it may be easy for their superiors to trace their response which will 
inevitably warrant disciplinary action. The two nurses, who happened to be the 
victims of the 2011 dismissals, echoed the same views.  Nevertheless, in the face of 
all these, the researcher had to remain observant to ethical principles guiding social 
research. 
3.10. Ethical Considerations 
By virtue of involving human subjects in the data collection process, there were 
ethical principles that the researcher had to carefully observe. Ethical considerations 
revolved around the data collection process and in the release of the results obtained. 
Prior to commencing the data collection process, permission was sought from 
different organisations. Consent forms were used to obtain permission of the 
participants who were initially informed about the purposes of the study and the 
overall meaning of the participation. Participation in the study was voluntary and 
participants had the liberty not to answer certain questions they felt uncomfortable 
with. To adhere to confidentiality and anonymity requirements, findings of this study 
narrate participants’ responses using pseudonyms. All the names used in this study are 
fictitious and findings of this study will be used for academic purposes only. 
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CHAPTER 4: BOTSWANA’S CONTESTED LABOUR 
RELATIONS REGIME: FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the character of labour relations in 
Botswana in the context of the 2011 public sector strike. This analysis reports the 
results in the qualitative form. Conducting qualitative research was essential for social 
inquiry. The report places emphasis on the perspective of the interviewees and 
focuses more on text rather than numbers. The researcher encouraged participants to 
express themselves in their language of preference thus some opted to answer 
questions in their native Tswana. 
4.2.  Participants views about the Botswana labour relations regime. 	  
The study revealed sharply polarised views about the Botswana labour 
relations regime. The interviewed public sector workers described the Botswana 
labour relations system in diverse ways. Whilst some felt that it is paradoxical others 
said it is problematic and is characterised by conflict. The majority of the interviewed 
public sector workers revealed that they were not conversant with the Public Service 
Act of 2008 and its clauses. Only three who indicated that they were aware of it and 
the reasons for its promulgation. One of the latter participants explained “the Public 
Service Act was promulgated to serve as a guiding tool for all public servants to know 
what is expected of them and the conduct they ought to display. Therefore, it is 
basically a document, teaching public servants about their labour rights”. Another 
worker just briefly said it was promulgated to basically guarantee employees’ job 
security. The union leaders explained that the promulgation was intended to make a 
unified law of governing public service sector from the fragmented one of the past. 
Sharing the same sentiments with the union leaders, Dan, a lecturer at the University 
of Botswana added that: 
There was a need to reconcile the Botswana labour laws with the international 
context so the Act should be seen as government’s acknowledgement that old 
laws had to be amended and made labour friendly for example lack of 
bargaining in the country has been an issue of concern therefore, the Act has 
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tried to incorporate it and therefore promulgation was done to make the labour 
relations system of Botswana worker friendly.   
Nonetheless, the majority of the workers downplayed the idea of a ‘worker 
friendly’ labour relations system. Although some workers alluded to the suggestion 
that the Act was meant to safeguard their labour rights, others felt that it does not have 
the workers interest at heart. Peter, one of the participants in the focus group 
lamented: 
Though I am not very conversant with the provisions on the Act, I just suspect 
our government was under immerse pressure so the Act was enacted when the 
stakeholders were not fully prepared for it. Therefore its enactment can be 
seen in the light of making a perfunctory effort to meet the expectation of the 
ILO so that it appears as if our government has the interest of the workers at 
heart. 
Tebogo, a female administration officer, despairingly remarked “the Act was 
implemented to fool Batswana workers to think that they have labour rights”. 
Additionally, another participant within the same group indicated: 
The Act was designed in such a way that the government is given enormous 
powers. Permanent secretaries within different ministries have been given the 
power to do as they please with the provisions of the Act. You wonder where 
they get all these powers. You can see that indeed the Act and its provisions 
were done hastily without even considering those it was drawn for, that is the 
workers. Ahhh!! (He sighed expressing frustration) what can we say this is 
really painful and stressful. 
When asked if he was aware of the Botswana Public Service Act and whether it is in 
line with the ILO standards, the ILO officer responded: 
 Yes I have seen the Act; actually Botswana is one of the few countries in 
Southern Africa, which ratified a Public Service labour Relations Convention 
number 151. Here in Southern Africa it is only Botswana and Zambia which 
have ratified this convention so ILO is quite aware of Botswana Act and it 
does meet the standards. In fact the ILO provided some technical assistance to 
the enactment of that Act.   
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Sharing the same sentiments with the ILO officer, Dan stated that, “In terms of 
ratifications yes the Act does comply with the ILO standards” however, he insisted 
that in practice the government still has a long way to ensure that the Act does comply 
with ILO standards.  He further stated: 
The government may just be commended for the strides made in drawing up 
an Act that is aligned to ILO standards but the fact that there is a wide gap 
between the time when the government accepted ILO recommendations and 
the time when it implemented the Act raises many questions.  
 
Mothusi, a union leader affiliated to BOFEPUSU, argued, “Initially, the 
government was reluctant to implement the Act but it was important that it is 
implemented so that its challenges could be seen and corrected”. The unionists 
explained that, one of the pertinent challenges regarding the Act is that, it is not clear 
in terms of certain procedures for example disciplinary procedures are not provided 
for in the new Public service Act. He indicated that: 
If you look at the old Acts they had the general orders, which explained 
procedures like for instance, the transfer of an employee from one duty station 
the other but the new Act does not have those. It is still empty and needs 
further developments. However, other clauses were taken, as they are from the 
old Acts especially those stifling workers’ rights for example the participation 
in politics.  
 
Although he commended the Act for introducing provisions for bargaining, he 
criticised the government for ratifying conventions that it fails to adhere to. Mothusi 
explained, “The Act captures what the ILO recommendations desire however, the 
government’s practice is at odds with this desire”    
 
Additionally, the law secretary at the Industrial court highlighted that lack of 
technocrats at the Botswana Parliament has played a role in the shortcomings 
surrounding the Botswana Public Service Act. Nani argued that the Act is so bulky 
and when you have members parliament of the caliber that Botswana has, it becomes 
very problematic. He indicated,  
Members of parliament usually compromise the important aspects of the Act 
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out of lack of understanding. The constitution of the Act has no problems but 
the problem now arise when the clauses of the Act has to be interpreted and 
put into practice.  
 
When asked if the clauses of the Act relating to the right to strike are indeed 
supportive of industrial actions, there was a general consensus among participants that 
the Act may have clauses supportive of industrial action strike but the government has 
and continues to do all it can to suppress this right. One of the union leaders 
highlighted that the government of Botswana does not respect workers’ right to strike. 
Kutlwano lamented that, “with the way the Act has been designed there is no way it 
can support workers’ right to strike”. In contrast the officer at the Ministry of labour 
convincingly argued, “The clause on strikes is very adequate and grants workers the 
right to strike as a form of bargaining tool”. Dan refuted the claim stating that the 
clause on the right to strike is very restrictive in terms of the type of workers who are 
allowed to strike. He argued: 
The issue of essential services brings another paradox, on one level the 
government acknowledges that workers can unionise but again it constrains 
the space in which unions can attract membership. It is worrisome that certain 
employees that rightly so should not be considered for essential services, the 
government thinks that they should be.  
 
Still on the issue of classification of essential services employees, two ILO 
officers also echoed the same views. Bobby argued that Botswana government did not 
follow the correct procedure in classifying the essential services employees. He 
emphasised, “there was no proper consultation with the labour advisory board”. As 
such Maziva, of the ILO, supposed that improper classification of essential services 
constituted violation of rights, which according to him, is the only violation that he 
noticed in the Botswana conflict. In rebuttal Samuel, Brown and Mothusi, who are 
BOFEPUSU union leaders, argued that violation of labour rights has been displayed 
in many instances besides classification of essential services. The three leaders cited 
repression of union activities such as industrial action and freedom of expression as 
some of the many examples of the manifestations of violations in Botswana. 
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 Brown and Mothusi cited that being a trade unionist in Botswana attracts 
numerous forms of abuse and unjustified castigation from the government. Brown 
lamented: 
As trade unions we are doing our best to try and accommodate the 
government, (who is also the employer) as our partner in the labour relations, 
but the government has become very aggressive. After the 2011 strike, the 
government became vindictive, trying by all means to muzzle if not terminate 
completely trade unionism in Botswana.  
 
Moreover, Mothusi lambasted: 
The government enjoyed the previous dispensation where it could alter the 
conditions unilaterally and increase salaries, pretending as if they cared for 
workers and therefore the government does not like the current situation where 
it has to treat unions as partners because under bargaining provisions, we are 
partners and have to share power equally. So the government is not prepared 
for this. Botswana government does not want unions to be seen as making 
progress because when you dilute the power of unions there is high possibility 
that members will lose their trust hence unions will loose membership”.  
 
Samuel also harangued the government for its hostile and punitive attitude towards 
unions and workers. He angrily remarked: 
In the previous regime there was some form cooperation between trade unions 
and the government, there used to be some form of agreements on pertinent 
labour issues however, that came to an instantaneous end after the 2011 strike. 
Since then till to date there is no agreement in anything, the current 
government works with directives and it severely violates workers’ rights.   
 
The teachers and nurses echoed the similar views like Mr. Samuel and his 
comrades. Nomfundo, a 37 year old primary school teacher in Lobatse lamented: 
Nna mma re berekela goromente yoo senang sepe ka rona le fa ele 
ditshwanelo tsa rona ke jaaka o bona re nna mo di kotoising tsa matlo mme 
go ka bo gotwe re berekela lefatshe le humileng.   
This generally translates that we are working for the government that cares less about 
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us or our rights that is why you see us staying in very small house yet we work for a 
wealthy country. Nomfundo who was interviewed at her rented house explained that 
she is not very familiar with the Public Service Act but all she knows is that it 
documents the rights of public service workers. The 37-year-old teacher, who took 
part in the 2011 strike, shared the suffering she and her two children endured when 
her salary was suspended after the government’s imposition of ‘no work no pay rule’. 
When asked why the strike, Nomfundo quickly answered “we wanted money 
unfortunately we wasted our efforts and energy”.  
 
Another primary school teacher from a different school but within the same 
town bewailed, “participation in the 2011 strike was big mistake that I will never 
repeat. The way the government dealt with us was a lesson that we must never ever 
engage in industrial action again”. Nakedi, a father of three, further explained that the 
consequences of their participation were agonising, their families suffered due to ‘no 
work no pay’ rule, they were crippled with debts because of borrowing money to feed 
the families during the period when their salaries were suspended and after all these 
sufferings they did not even get the anticipated 16% increment. He highlighted that 
the majority of the teachers who took part in the 2011 strike, especially those in urban 
areas where union activities are prevalent, were transferred to far rural places to 
discourage them from taking part in union activities. The two teachers mentioned that 
the complicated relationship between the government and trade unions makes the 
work difficult for unions to effectively represent their needs. Nakedi sadly noted, “We 
would rather not voice out our discontent because we fear the repercussions of doing 
so”. When these two teachers were narrating their stories, the fear that they expressed 
was not only revealed in their speech but also in practice as they kept on looking 
around to see if there was anyone around who could report them to the seniors. The 
atmosphere was so tense and clouded by discomfort on the side of the teachers. They 
could not explicitly declare that the government is hostile towards workers’ rights 
despite all their lamentations something that can arguably be traced to the fear that 
overwhelmed them.   
 
Unlike the teachers, nurses were rather relaxed during the interview even 
though they had encountered the worst consequences than teachers. Rauwe and 
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Tebogo are two of the many nurses in Botswana who were dismissed, selectively re-
employed and consequently redeployed owing to their participation in the strike. Both 
two health workers who were interviewed simultaneously requested that their 
interviews should not be recorded arguing that they are scared of victimisation. 
Tebogo recommended Rauwe as a potential participant through snowball sampling 
and the two suggested that they be interviewed together at a place far from their 
workplaces to preclude suspicions from fellow workers. The two nurses indicated that 
they did not know much about the Public Service Act but they knew that they 
belonged to essential service professionals before the strike. However, they cited the 
information they got from their unions was that this was a special case and as such 
their participation will not attract any disciplinary action let alone dismissal because 
they were not the only essential service workers who participated in the strike as 
doctors were also involved.  
 
Tebogo narrated that during the strike they received letters from their 
employer (the government of Botswana) warning them against participation in the 
strike but she said they remained unwavering because they presumed that they were 
legally covered through their trade unions but what happened next really shocked 
them. She explained, “the government used its powerful hand ka gore tota ene indeed 
o nale letsogo le tona to catch us and deny us the right to express our dissatisfaction”. 
The fellow nurses added that even though the government did not want the workers to 
express their dissatisfaction, they remained relentless. The nurse said the fact that the 
government prevented workers to display their discontent demonstrates that that there 
is a lot that the government is not doing well in respect of the public service. 
Nonetheless, Rauwe blamed the unions for their dismissals arguing that it seemed 
their union leaders did not know the correct procedures to follow before and during 
the strike. The two nurses described their dismissal as an act of suppression. When 
asked to describe the Botswana labour relations system Tebogo said it is a tit-for-tat 
type of system. She said, when unions say one the government says two so the fact 
that the two important actors in the system are at war makes the labour relations very 
complicated. Rauwe added that the government is very suppressive and they used not 
to be aware of this until the 2011 strike. Two foreign national doctors who worked in 
Botswana in 2011 expressed similar thoughts with regards to the misconception they 
had about the labour relations system of Botswana. The two doctors, who left 
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Botswana during the pandemonium of 2011, revealed that they left Botswana out fear 
that the relation between the government and medical doctors was strained and the 
government was not making any efforts to restore it. Doctor Moyo and doctor Phiri 
were interviewed via Skype. 
 
Dr. Moyo explained that when he first arrived in Botswana from his native 
country, everything seemed rosy. According to him, when he first arrived in 2005, 
Botswana was one of the countries with the most attractive Public sector salaries in 
Southern Africa. Furthermore, the relationship between doctors, their immediate 
superiors at work and the permanent secretaries at the Ministry of Health was so 
harmonious that one could not expect that merely 6years down the line things would 
have totally taken a different twist. The doctor indicated that he did not know much 
about the Public Service Act even though it was at his exposure. He ascribed his 
ignorance of the Act and its clauses on the fact that his employment contract 
discouraged any involvement in political or union activities therefore he did not feel 
compelled to know what is in Act.    
 
Owing to the fact that foreign doctors are not allowed to participate in 
industrial action, Dr. Moyo lamented that although he had loved to participate, he was 
bound by the terms and conditions of his contract not to. The 42year Medical Officer 
lamented: 
Unlike South African and Namibian laws, Botswana laws are unfairly 
prejudiced against foreign doctors in that they give us limited labour rights. 
Although we were similarly affected by low salaries akin to our Tswana 
colleague doctors, unlike them we could not openly voice out our grievances.  
 
Dr. Moyo shared the same thoughts with the nurses that the labour relations 
system of Botswana is oppressive. He complained that the government of Botswana 
just wants public sector workers to accept what it gives without querying. He felt that 
the government does not care about the needs of its employees even the scarce skills 
cadres like doctors. The doctor narrated how dreadful the situation was at the hospital 
where he was before leaving the country. He lamented “foreign doctors were 
overwhelmed by work as they had to run all the departments by themselves whilst 
their Tswana colleague doctors went on strike. You can imagine how it is when a 
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doctor is overwhelmed by work, it is really risky”.  
 
His views resonating with those of his colleague, Dr. Phiri, a senior Medical 
Officer who has since moved to South Africa, explained that Botswana government 
has curtailed the doctors’ right to strike yet no mechanisms are put in place to make 
up for that restriction. The 50 year-old doctor, who worked in Botswana since 2000 
until 2011, also felt that Botswana labour laws are so restrictive especially to 
foreigners and recommended that they must be loosened. He cited South Africa as an 
example where the laws are not biased against any nationality. He remarked, “here in 
South Africa all the doctors who qualify to do locum jobs are welcome irrespective of 
nationality yet the salaries are better than in Botswana but in Botswana no public 
sector doctor can work elsewhere besides the hospital where he is appointed to by the 
government”. Dr. Phiri suggested that Botswana labour laws should be revised 
especially those regulating employment of foreign nationals. He argued: 
Had the foreign doctors been allowed to join unions like here in South Africa, 
the strike would have borne fruits for public sector workers as involvement of 
foreign doctors would have meant closure of hospital and this chilling thought 
of having hospital closed would have shaken the government to act swiftly. 
Remember, Botswana government is immensely dependent on the manpower 
of foreign doctors.   
 
Although the two doctors felt that their colleagues’ participation in the strike 
was justified, the interviewed ILO officers condemned this involvement because 
doctors, by virtue of dealing with people’s lives in their job, belong to essential 
services group and their involvement in strike may put lives in danger. According to 
Bobby, if a doctor goes on strike even for an hour, this interruption of his/her services 
puts lives at risk therefore there is no way doctors’ involvement in a protest can be 
justified. From this perspective, the dismissal of doctors who went on strike in 2011 
was fair although the same cannot be said with regards to teachers. Nonetheless, 
Nakedi described the government’s decision to classify teaching under essential 
services as ‘total madness”. 
 
 However, Bobby warned, “We have to be cautious that we do not use this 
term ‘essential service’ in a cut and dry manner. Although teaching in its literal sense 
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is not an essential service, if it is interrupted for a lengthy period of time and indeed 
its interruption endangers lives then it becomes a different story”, Bobby explained. 
Whilst union leaders vehemently criticised the government’s decision to re-classify 
professions arguing that it was way of denying workers the right to strike, Shima, the 
officer at the Ministry of labour said, “there was a need for government to respond in 
the way it responded to the 2011 strike because it was a new occurrence in the history 
of Botswana’s labour relations so there was a need to define it” He further explained 
“The right to strike is there, given to workers but it should be regulated so some of the 
development experienced during and after the strike was a way of regulating the strike 
process”.  
 
Maziva and Sethunqolo of ILO shared the same thought with Shima as they 
argued that the response was not one sided. Sethunqolo suggested that the response 
should be looked at in the context of all the parties involved that is the government, 
workers and the trade unions. She questioned “Were all the parties given adequate 
education on labour relations matters in Botswana? According to her, one of the 
biggest problems with Botswana case is the lack of social dialogue structures. With 
regards to the complaint raised by unions that much had not been done since they 
reported their grievances to ILO, Sethunqolo answered, 
The internal feuds between BFTU and BOFEPUSU are an impediment to ILO 
intervention, ILO signed partnership agreement with BFTU as per the 
recommendation of the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs in Botswana. So 
BFTU is the officially recognised partner. However, BOFEPUSU also wants 
equal rights but because it has not yet been recognised by the Ministry of 
Labour and Home Affairs as the most representative federation this becomes 
problematic so the case is still with the Ministry. 
 
BFTU is inclusive of both public and private sector unions which meets the 
definition of representative. BOFEPUSU on the other hand has a large membership 
but represents only government sector unions and as such it is not representative of 
workers as a whole. Maziva commented, “Theoretically it makes sense for BFTU to 
be recognised but practically it should be BOFEPUSU that is recognised”. Both 
officers advised that BFTU and BOFEPUSU should resolve their disputes, as this 
would pave the way for ILO to effectively intervene and ensure that Botswana labour 
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relations conflict is resolved. Nonetheless, they explained that this does not mean ILO 
has not done anything though to help Botswana. Another officer from the ILO 
explained, “The ILO has offered a number of intervention strategies to the public 
sector unions in Botswana to ensure smooth industrial relations (IR) in the public 
sector”. The organisation held a bipartite workshop on collective bargaining in the 
public service in Francistown, Botswana on the 13th to 17th August 2012. The activity 
was a collaborative effort between the Decent Work Team from Pretoria and the 
Sector ILO Headquarters. This was meant to promote the implementation of Public 
Service (Labour Relations) Convention, 1978 (No.151) by Botswana.  
 
According to Julie: “This activity was held in line with the priorities of the 
Botswana Decent Work Country Programme which among other things seeks to 
improve the capacity of labour administration system to service collective bargaining 
and conciliation and arbitration mechanisms in the public sector”. Julie acknowledged 
that although the bargaining council is now operational it is still at a ‘teething stage’ 
and still experiencing some challenges. On the other hand, Bobby explained that one 
of the problems with Botswana bargaining council is that when it was established 
after the 2011 strike, the parties did not set a framework for it so ILO has been trying 
to help Botswana to establish the framework, to learn some negotiation skills, to have 
procedures on how to conduct their meetings and resolve disputes. “Whenever these 
processes are underway the government or government representatives are invited, as 
it is imperative that they take part in them” Bobby explained. When asked if the 
government’s decision to pull out of bargaining talks does not undermine ILO’s 
efforts. Bobby quickly answered, “That issue is very complex, when you look at it 
you will realise that unions also are to be blamed not that I am saying the government 
is right but the political involvement of some public service unionists necessitated the 
government’s action”. Maziva shared the same view adding that Botswana public 
sector unions’ involvement in politics imply that “they want to bite the hand that feeds 
them”  
In contrast to this view, unions maintained that they never uttered any political 
statement. All they said, according to Samuel was that they would endorse in the 
upcoming elections a political party that had the interest of workers at heart. 
Accordingly, the government accusation that trade unions brought politics to the 
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bargaining table was just a “flimsy excuse by a government that is running away from 
its responsibility to grant workers their labour rights” Samuel emphasised.  
 
The opinion that the government is not willing to give workers their full 
labour rights was also expressed by some public service workers. Peter, a Principal 
administration officer argued: 
The government of Botswana will never grant us full labour rights. In fact it 
will rather take away our right to form unions that’s why it is fighting trade 
unions. It is the wish of the government to see union density reducing in 
Botswana. If the government was willing to grant us full labour rights it would 
not be as litigious as it is currently. The government of Botswana is ever ready 
to go to court with its employees and trade unions. The bargaining council up 
to now is still not fruitful. In fact our government doesn’t even want the 
bargaining council to function. Had it not been for the pursuit made unions to 
compel the government to allow for formation of bargaining council we would 
not even be having it in Botswana because the government enjoys calling the 
shorts. 
 
Eric added, “The current government and its leadership do not want any change 
inclined towards employees enjoying their labour rights. The government is using its 
reviews as Africa’s shining example to repress workers. Our labour laws show that 
the government is not determined to allow workers the freedom to exercise their 
rights. That’s why I still insist that our Public Service Act is useless”  
 
Although workers lacked confidence that the system will ever change for the 
better, their union leaders were not as skeptical. “First and foremost”, Samuel said 
enthusiastically, “there is a need for regime change because with the current 
government you cannot expect anything positive change so workers need to voice out 
using their vote in the upcoming elections”. Additionally a fellow unionist suggested 
that public service workers must be sensitised on pertinent issues like labour rights. 
Grace, a 29 year old labour relations officer revealed: “Public sector workers are not 
well informed on their rights and the government has realised this loophole that is 
why it keeps on using threats and intimidations to silence workers, who often flinch 
out of fear of what the government can do to them”.   
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Against this Shima refuted the claim that government is capitalising on 
workers’ lack of labour rights knowledge. According to him, the same government 
that workers accuse is making efforts through different programs to take knowledge to 
workers. He added: 
We have a radio slot on Duma FM where we take time to teach workers about 
labour issues and their rights. During these live programs, workers are allowed 
to air their views and ask questions. We also have outreaches, even though 
they are not done often, but they assist us to reach a large audience in bus 
ranks, shopping malls where we inform Batswana about important labour 
issues. 
 
4.3.  Conclusion  
Almost all the public service workers shared a mutual consensus that the government 
is violating their rights. Nevertheless, none of the ILO officers and Ministry of labour 
officers corroborated those claims. Julie, from ILO emphasised that “Botswana is by 
no means close to serious violations of human and workers’ rights. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE CHARACTER OF BOTSWANA’S LABOUR 
RELATIONS SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE 2011 PUBLIC 
SECTOR STRIKE 	  
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter four has narrated the responses of various participants with regards to the 
labour relations conflict that arose out of 2011 strike. Findings display discordant 
views of workers and their unions and those of the ILO and the Ministry of labour 
representatives. This chapter will analyse these responses using some key words 
voiced out as key themes.  
 
 
Implementation of Public Service Act a ‘purposeless’ effort 
 
Botswana made sufficiently important and noteworthy efforts to domesticate 
International Conventions and Recommendations through promulgation of legal 
instruments in the form of Trade Disputes Act No.15 of 2004 as well as the Public 
Service Act No.30 of 2008. However, as Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) 
observed, the absence of relevant stakeholders during the drafting of the Public 
Service Act has adversely affected the country’s complicated industrial relations. 
Exclusion of workers and trade unions is very problematic because democracy in its 
practice requires the participation of the people, thus if people who are largely 
affected by the Act are not allowed a  say in how it is drafted and its content, then 
clearly democracy is undermined.    
 
Marginalisation of stakeholders, most importantly demonstrates the historical 
hostile relationship between the government and the labour movement. Since 
independence the government of Botswana has made attempts to dominate unions and 
limit their activities. This has been revealed by the response to 2011 strike which 
arguably exhibits continuation of the historical dominance that government has over 
unions. The 2011 public sector strike did not only worsen the historically strained 
relation between the two partners but also exposed it to the world. Although the 
promulgation of the Trade Disputes Act was intended to settle trade disputes and to 
further secure and maintain good industrial relations through the industrial court, the 
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state of labour relations in Botswana remains fractious (Dithapelo, 2013; 
Kaboyakgosi and Marata, 2012). Owing to the evident fragmented labour relations in 
the country, workers criticised the Public Service Act as a fallacy. One worker 
lamented that, when endorsing the Act, the government did not create a platform on 
which the public, especially government employees, could have a debate with regards 
to its contents. Consequently most of the pertinent issues in respect of workers 
interests have been left out. The feeling amongst public sector workers is that their 
labour rights are not adequately addressed by the Act as such they feel it is a 
purposeless piece of legislation that serves the interest of the ruling elite. Others feel 
that the Act codifies what the government fails to practice with a consequent 
contradiction between Botswana labour laws and government’s practice. Workers 
expressed divergent views in respect of the Public Service Act but a common 
declaration amongst all of them was that the Act has not offered any significant 
assistance in their struggle to gain full labour rights. On the one hand it gives the 
workers important labour rights and on the other it takes away those rights, declared 
one public servant from the Rolong land board.   
 
Experience has shown that change is a difficult phenomenon yet inevitable 
and people will not buy into any change program that they have not been part of. It is 
not surprising that public sector workers in Botswana have a negative perception of 
the new Act and its implementation. One of the democratic principles that have been 
historically upheld in Botswana is consultation through kgotla meetings but now it 
appears this principle, which has been acting as crucial glue that holds the society 
together, is slowly dissolving thus bringing into question the integrity of democracy in 
contemporary Botswana. As Dinokopila (2013) indicates, for democracy to function 
properly it needs a constitutional framework that will ensure that there is no arbitrary 
use of power but this cannot be said, especially after the 2011 public strike. According 
to Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) during the historic public service strike, 
Parliament became useless, caught in no man’s land and not knowing what role it 
could play in addressing the demands of civil servants.  
Kaboyakgosi and Marata (2012) argue that democracy in Botswana has in recent 
years emerged as a minimalist and hence lacks the characteristic of facilitating broad-
based participation. The President’s autocratic temperament and his intransigent 
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refusal to countenance discussion and compromise threaten the future of Botswana 
(Throup, 2011). Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) observe that the unlimited 
powers that the President has, to act in his own deliberate judgment without having to 
consult anyone, is a potential assault to democracy. The peril of these unlimited 
powers became patent in the 2011 strike when the president abused his governmental 
authority and unilaterally declared Statutory Instrument No. 50 of 2011 that re-
classified some public servants under essential services. This decision revealed the 
erosion of parliamentary powers by an executive presidency and constitutional failure 
to create effective checks and balances. It is for this reason and many others that 
Botswana labour relations has received mostly negative reviews.  
The character of labour relations in Botswana: hostile, repressive archaic or 
adversarial? 	  
It is said that, conflict is inherently part of any industrial relations environment. 
Whilst Flanders and Dunlop believe that industrial relations conflict can be regulated 
by web of rules, Hyman condemns this view, arguing that emphasis should not be on 
how to control and contain conflict but rather on how industrial relations can 
incorporate the contradictory processes within the capitalist system (Ilesanmi, Ishola 
and Yusuf, 2013). Industrial relations is by nature contradictory and is characterised 
by both cooperation and antagonism between labour and capital. According to 
Edwards (2003) an element of cooperation is necessary because both the employer 
and employees ultimately depend on each other for the future success of the work 
organisation. Nonetheless, the two partners are also locked in a relationship that is 
antagonistic in that they always have different interests. Edwards (2003) explains that 
although the employers and employees depend on each other, the relationship is 
underlain by ‘structured antagonism’. While it is the workers’ capacity that is being 
used in the production process within the workplace, the control of this capacity 
resides with employers. Workers cannot decide on how their labour power should be 
deployed and this usually causes conflict especially when it comes to the value of the 
labour power.  
In Botswana, the government is the largest employer in the country and it 
regulates wages. The fact that the government has powers to regulate employment 
regulations in Botswana infringes on workers’ rights, enshrined in the Public Service 
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Act. For example, the Act allows for workers’ organisation into trade unions, which 
incorporates engaging in industrial action but because of the excessive powers vested 
in the government this right has been severely constrained. When asked to describe 
the Botswana labour relations workers adverbs such as, very bad, suppressive, 
repressive archaic and adversarial sprang into mind. 
Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012:72) remark that “the 2011 industrial 
relations developments in Botswana’s public service have been horrific as the country 
had never experienced a strike of that magnitude”. The government’s paternalistic 
role in industrial relations became apparent in the 2011 strike. The workers’ freedom 
of speech was blatantly violated as the government used intimidation and threats to 
silence workers as a means to pressure them to back down on their demands. 
Seemingly the government of Botswana is uncomfortable with workers who voice 
dissatisfaction and the idea of suppressing complaints has roots in the country’s 
history.   
Botswana has for many years been revered for good governance and stable 
democracy. For many years the government of Botswana has been described as the 
‘government of the people for the people and by the people’. The country was well 
known for good salaries and working conditions that attracted considerable amount of 
foreign workforce. Owing to the glowing reviews that Botswana has received, the 
majority of the people around the world and even in Botswana have been persuaded 
that Botswana is a perfect model of democracy where human and labour rights are 
supported. Industrial action was not a common occurrence as most of the disputes 
were settled through peaceful negotiations.  However, the events leading to the 2011 
strike and after demonstrate that it was a matter of time before the true picture of 
Botswana could be shown to the world.  
Fayoshin (1998) has observed that, although Botswana has enjoyed the status 
of being the most stable and prosperous economy in the continent, it has 
comparatively little experience in collective bargaining. Moreover, trade unions are 
free but they have been powerless to use the bargaining machinery for beneficial 
results.  Subsequent to the 2011 strike, trade unions held bargaining negotiations with 
the government on salary increment. However, the government withdrew from the 
negotiations and unilaterally increased salaries of non-unionised employees by 4%, a 
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move that clearly contradict democratic principles that the country assumedly to 
ascribes to. Although the Committee of Experts on application of ILO Conventions 
and Recommendations has criticised the government of Botswana for undermining 
the bargaining council, it is still to be seen if it will indeed create conducive 
environment for the frictionless functioning of the Public Service Bargaining Council 
that ILO has recommended. 
It has become a tradition if not a norm that the government runs the industrial 
relations using directives. The development of industrial relations in Botswana has 
been negatively influenced by the Tswana political system. In this system leadership 
position was attained by means of primogeniture and birthright.  This system has 
cultivated subservience of Batswana. As Maundeni (2008) indicates, in Tswana 
Political administration, systematic constitutional violation was the norm as large 
segment of the population was excluded from participating in politics by the 
‘birthright’ law. Citizens could not question this as they were made to believe that it 
was the natural way of doing things. This distorted system of leadership and 
governance has been extended into the present political system. The current 
government expects citizens, especially the working class, to accept all its decisions 
as a norm without questioning. President Khama’s tendency to make unilateral 
decisions regarding pertinent labour relations issues may be located in the Tswana 
political illusion that leaders possess natural authority. 
According to Taylor (2003), after independence, Batswana were submerged in 
a traditionalist culture of respect for authority which hindered any disputing of the 
post-colonial dispensation. This had a lot to do with the fact that first president of 
Botswana was also the heir to Bangwato throne. As Taylor (2003:8) argues, 
“crucially, at independence the first president, Seretse Khama, enjoyed a legitimacy, 
drawn from his position as (former) chief of the dominant Tswana tribe (the 
Bangwato) that was unrivalled”. Through Tswana culture, the ruling elite was able to 
inculcate blind patriotism in the minds of Batswana whereby considerable attempts 
were made to turn the citizens into passive spectators. This, according to Taylor 
(2003:8), “granted space to Khama and his BDP to begin the task of establishing a 
hegemonic position within post-independence Botswana, something that his royal 
status had importantly prepared the ground for”. The same can also be said about 
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President Ian Khama. Seemingly, being the first son of the first president instills some 
proprietary outlook in the current president. This is evidenced by the tendencies of 
overstepping his constitutional power and running the country as his personal 
property.    
Following the 2011 strike, President Ian Khama adopted a very hostile attitude 
towards trade unions in an endeavour to weaken the fighting capacity of the labour 
movement and subsequently coercing them to concede defeat (Moupo, 2011). Union 
leaders lamented that after the 2011 strike, the president has refused to sit for 
negotiations with them to find a way forward in creating a harmonious industrial 
relations. The unconcealed high levels of intolerance towards trade unions after 2011, 
demonstrates that the government of Botswana either disdains the potent weapon 
conferred on the labour movement, by the LO and ITUC or the government is still 
under an illusion that Batswana workers are still meekly obedient as they were in the 
previous political dispensation. The president seems to ignore the fact that, unlike 
during his father’s tenure, where the majority of Batswana were ignorant on their 
rights, nowadays many Batswana are informed on both human and labour rights.  The 
president, through his draconian strategies, displays an attitude of wanting public 
sector workers and their trade unions to inherit the traditional system of passively 
conforming to authority.    
Nonetheless, this is unviable in the current society because global 
interconnectedness has changed the landscape of labour relations in many countries. 
In previous years, conflict was completely avoided but, as Motshegwa and Tshukudu 
(2012) explain, with the advent of work and infusion of Western values and 
principles, the value system of Botswana (peaceful coexistence, consultation and 
participation in decision making processes) has changed dramatically. Unions can no 
longer passively accept to be subordinated to the position of junior partners.  
Undoubtedly, the state of Botswana labour relations system has been disrupted 
by the government’s selfish ambition of reinforcing its hegemony. Admittedly, 
Botswana has made commendable strides in human developments and helping 
citizens to improve their standards of living but these efforts has been marred by the 
violation of workers’ rights. Public service workers in Botswana no longer feel like 
they have any right because if they voice out their concerns they risk losing their jobs 
Page 77 of 112	  
an occurrence that is incongruous with the widely publicised positive reviews of 
Botswana governance. It is very odd for a country that has been extensively labelled 
as Africa’s example of shining democracy and good governance to have a labour 
relations system besmirched with intimidation, threats and consequently fear.  
 
Cloud of Fear in Africa’s shining example of democracy 	  
In Botswana, as Good (2009) explains deference remains important in the society, 
upheld as the desired norm by the ruling elite in their admonitions that even 
questioning authority constitutes abuse. Violation of the right to freedom of speech is 
rife but veiled by the subservient character of Tswana people cultivated by the 
Tswana Political System. This system promoted docility under the pretext of creating 
a unified and peaceful society. It is in this regard that the government of Botswana 
responded to the strike with anger thereby instilling an overwhelming fear in public 
servants.  
The expression ‘o tla ikgolega’ was prevalent in a number of government 
institutions. This expression carries huge implications, the most obvious one being 
suppression. Public servants in Botswana revealed that they live under perpetual fear 
since the implementation of the DIS. This security agency has become synonymous 
with terror. According to workers, intimidation and threats by the government became 
rife after the 2011 strike. It is alleged that the government deployed its agents to spy 
on workers, to find out those who are against it. The question is, why should it be an 
issue of concern for the government to know who is opposing its mandate and who is 
not, because constitutionally Botswana is a liberal democracy where freedom of 
speech is a right. However, the manner in which the government acted during and 
after the strike undermines its commitment to the ILO. Although ILO representatives 
downplayed unions’ complaint that the government is violating workers’ rights, the 
fear that Batswana workers expressed is on its own a crucial exposure of violation.  
 
The government sought to weaken unions through intimidation and vindictive 
strategies. As one unionist lamented, once unions are weak, workers will lose 
confidence in their representatives thus nurturing termination of memberships. The 
government of Botswana is very much aware that reducing union membership will 
further weaken the already struggling Botswana labour movement not least because it 
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is almost solely dependent on membership fees to sustain itself. If members are 
reduced, this will certainly erode its power and the government is capitalising on this 
erosion of union power to successfully suppress the already withering right to strike.   	  
The withering away of the right to strike. 	  
Strikes are an integral weapon used by workers worldwide to get employers to attend 
to their grievances and the right to strike is one of the fundamental labour rights to 
which workers are entitled and the ILO affirms it. In Botswana, the right of 
employees to strike is fully recognised by the law but most of the strike that has 
occurred in the country has been termed illegal (Marobela, 2011). In the previous 
legal dispensation, the right to strike was impossible to enjoy because the law almost 
prohibited it in both the public and private sector (Keorapetse, 2013). However, in an 
attempt to commit itself to promotion of a legal system that endorses the rule of law in 
line with the international standards, Botswana promulgated the Public Service Act of 
2008 that enshrines the right to strike. However, events surrounding the 2011 public 
sector strike demonstrate that, even though Botswana government formally recognises 
the right to strike, violation of this right is very high. 
 
The 2011 strike exposed the complex character of the Botswana labour 
relations systems, a development that workers termed an ‘insult’ to Botswana 
government. The suppression of the right to strike by Botswana government has for 
long been camouflaged by the ostensible reason that Botswana is a peaceful country 
with stable industrial relations. The hegemonic BDP government instilled this false 
consciousness in the minds of the population at large including workers to cultivate a 
sense of passivity in respect to labour rights’ awareness amongst civil servants. 
Nonetheless, as Dithapelo (2013) posits, unions in the public service and other 
progressive forces fought hard to improve the antagonistic environment that public 
servants operated in. The victory of this fight was seen in the endorsement of both the 
Trade Dispute Act and the Public Service Act (Dithapelo, 2013). Although this 
seemed like a triumph for Botswana labour movement, it was ‘a paradox of victory’. 
While the government allowed public servants the freedom to strike via the Trade 
Dispute and Public Service Act, it also curtailed it through the difficult procedures 
required to have a legal strike. A general consensus amongst the interviewed public 
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servants was that they do not have the right to strike. They underline the fact that 
although it is provided for in paper, in practice the right to strike is non-existent as 
even validated by the government’s harsh response to the strike. During the 2011 the 
government dismissed workers classified under essential services, froze the salaries of 
non-essential service workers, transferred some to awkward places and demoted 
others or even worse, frustrated them (Dithapelo, 2013). This, as Dithapelo (2013) 
further explains, was a declaration of war on workers and their unions.  
 
The vindictive and personalised turn of events that became obvious after the 
strike, is just an exhibition of the government’s inclination towards suppression of 
workers’ rights especially the right to strike. The state has employed all the potential 
mechanisms including outright oppression disseminated by the militaristic leadership 
style of president Khama, to greatly undermine and repress the right to strike but this 
will take more efforts to be a successful pursuit. Botswana public servants displayed 
remarkable defiance during the strike, in the face of much adversity and official 
hostility. Therefore, even if the government can reinforce its oppression and efforts to 
subdue the workers’ fundamental right to strike this will not be without resistance 
from the workers whose illusions about the democratic character of the Botswana 
government have since been cleared. As Moupo (2011) observed, the 2011 strike has 
provided workers with a unique opportunity of assessing the tactics, strategy and 
character of the Botswana government.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 	  
6.1. Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to shed a light on the character of Botswana’s industrial 
relations since colonial period. The study has highlighted that trade unionism in 
Botswana has faced a myriad of challenges which have significantly impacted its 
development. Botswana has historically had weak trade unionism owing to various 
reasons one being the landscape within which it operated. Botswana has always been 
revered as a democratic, peaceful country inclined towards enhancing human 
capabilities. However, such reviews have prejudiced union activities in the country as 
they have been seen as a countermovement to the government’s project of 
maintaining peace and good governance for all the citizens. Despite the formal 
perception that, by virtue of being a democratic country, Botswana upholds human 
and labour rights, union activities have been suppressed. The government of 
Botswana has always subordinated unions to the role of junior partners in industrial 
relations. Furthermore, the government has made significant efforts to discourage 
trade unions from engaging in politics attempting to narrow their focus and scope to 
mere bread and butter issues. This has contributed to the weak political orientation of 
the Botswana trade unions. This weakness has worked in favour of the BDP-led 
government as it managed to reinforce its dominance over the civil servants for many 
years.   
 
The fact that the government has predominantly funded Botswana trade unions 
fairly incapacitated them to freely voice out on issues pertaining to social change in 
the interest of the broader working class. In previous years, the labour movement in 
could seldom criticise the government’s biased socio-economic policies, which in 
most cases disadvantage the broader working class. Unions shied away from openly 
critiquing the government, as this seemed like they are biting the hand that feeds 
them. Compounding the weakness of the Botswana labour movement was the absence 
of collective bargaining, which is a powerful tool for trade unions worldwide. 
Nonetheless, owing to the pressure mounted on the government by trade unions, 
Botswana labour relations landscape was transformed by the endorsement of the 
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Public Service Act of 2008 and the Trade dispute Act which in theory but not in 
practice grant workers full labour rights including the right to strike. However, 
although the government of Botswana has ratified ILO conventions that encompass 
the right to strike, workers are still denied full access of this right.    
 
The 2011 public sector strike demonstrated that public service workers in 
Botswana are still oppressed and denied their labour rights. The laws governing the 
public sector are still unjust and oriented towards favouring the government more than 
workers. This injustice can be tracked down to Botswana’s constitution which confers 
excessive rights on the president at the detriment of the employees. It is for this reason 
that the 2011 strike did not yield any profitable results for the workers because 
nobody had the power to overturn the president’s ruling with regards to salary 
increment. Effectively, the constitution gives the president powers to regulate the 
broader civil service and this on its own implies some degree of contravention of 
workers’ rights especially those pertaining to freedom of speech and engaging in 
industrial action. Contravention of workers’ rights played out during the bargaining 
talks when the government just withdrew from negotiations unilaterally.  Although 
the Public Service Act and the Trade Dispute oblige the government to negotiate with 
unions in good faith, minimal efforts have been made to establish effectively 
functioning Bargaining Council. This is largely due to the adversarial and 
confrontational relationship between the labour movement and the government.  	  
Government’s hostility towards trade unions and consequently public sector 
workers worsened after the 2011 strike when it became apparent that Batswana are no 
longer docile. The aftermath of strike displayed the actual character of Botswana 
government that has been previously concealed by the misleading positive reviews of 
democracy and good governance. The government’s response to the strike 
demonstrated that Botswana industrial relations is controlled and dominated by one 
partner; which is the employer. Other partners like the trade unions are just 
subordinates. Throughout the strike and after, the government refused to cooperate 
with unions towards attainment of an amicable solution of harmonising the country’s 
conflictual industrial relations. The government did not only refuse to accede to the 
16% salary increment but also took away workers’ right to strike through its 
repressive strategies such as unfair dismissals and selective re-employment of the 
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dismissed workers. It is against this background that this study infers that Botswana 
labour relations system is oppressive to workers and their trade unions. This has been 
proven by many conflicts and controversies that resulted from the 2011 public sector 
strike. 
 
6.2. Recommendations 
In the view of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made in 
the hope that they will help in mending the adversarial industrial relations in 
Botswana. 
1. There is a need to revise the Constitution of Botswana because as it is now it 
gives the president enormous powers which has proven to be detrimental to 
the working class. During and after the 2011 strike the president habitually 
made unilateral decisions and the parliament, as the judiciary body could not 
do much to counteract the powers of the executive. The parliament was 
rendered to a subordinate position with regards to the decisions made by the 
president and this arguably exposed the weaknesses within the checks and 
balance system of Botswana.  2. Immediate action is imperative to solve the internal feuds within the labour 
movement. ILO officials explained that the rift between BFTU and 
BOFEPUSU compounds their efforts to intervene in solving the conflict 
between the government of Botswana and public sector unions. The two trade 
union federations ought to realise that their feud is also giving the government 
some leverage to oppress public sector unions as such public servants will 
continue to be subdued by the government.	  3. There is a need to educate Batswana workers especially those in the public 
service on their rights because another loophole used by the government is the 
fact that many Batswana are ignorant of the labour laws. Public sector unions 
need to establish education programs through which workers can be taught 
labour laws and their rationale. A significant number of respondents attested 
that they don’t know much about the Acts governing the public service.	  4. Public sector unions needs to work hard on canvassing support from workers 
because reliance on government for funds makes them powerless when it 
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comes to openly critiquing government policies that are not in favour of the 
workers.	  
5. Finally, the government of Botswana must realise that the labour relations 
landscape has changed due to globalisation. Strikes are now globally 
recognised as a powerful tool for improvement of the socio-economic lives of 
workers. Labour movements now interact on global level and exchange skills 
with each other on pertinent labour issues. If the government could realise and 
acknowledge the fact that workers are now empowered to liberally access their 
rights and reduce interference in the trade unions activities, the probability of 
conflict within the industrial relations will be significantly reduced.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: REQUEST LETTER AND CONSENT FORMS 
 
 
 
 
Mpho P. Mwatcha. Email: patymwatcha@gmail.com/870949@students.wits.ac.za 
 
 
For Academic purposes only 
 
BOTSWANA’S LABOUR RELATIONS SYSTEM AND THE LESSONS FROM 
2011 PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKES 
 
 
Dear Potential Respondent 
 
My name is Mpho Patience Mwatcha. I am a Masters student in the Global Labour 
University Programme at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. As part of 
the requirements for a Master Degree at Wits University, I have to carry out a 
research study. The study I am doing is concerned with the character of Botswana’s 
Labour Relations and lessons from the 2011 public sector strikes. The study intends to 
investigate whether Botswana’s labour relations system, through its legislation 
impede on the workers’ right to strike and/or engage in industrial action. It also 
examines the prevailing labour conditions relating to the right to strikes as contained 
in the Public Service Act of 2008 with specific reference to instances relating to the 
historical public servants strike of 2011.  
 
I therefore request to conduct an interview with you to get your views on the subject.  
Participation in this study is voluntary and your name will not be written anywhere. 
Respondents for this study are selected using random sampling. This technique selects 
population of study with specific purpose in mind. In this study the specific purpose is 
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to find out the perception of public sector employees on the character of Botswana’s 
labour relations system. 
 
You are free to choose not to answer certain questions that you may feel 
uncomfortable with. The interviews will last for approximately an hour and will be 
recorded and deleted once the researcher has finished to transcribe them. The final 
report that will be published on the university website will use pseudonyms to protect 
your right to anonymity.  
 
There are no known risks associated with this research. There are no benefits to you 
or to the researcher that would result from your participation in this research. The 
information you give will be for academic purposes only and will be treated with 
confidentiality. If you have any questions or concerns about this study please contact 
the University of Witwatersrand, Global Labour University (GLU) Programme 
telephone number: 27 (0) 11 717 4443/4479. If you agree to participate in this study 
kindly sign the consent form below to demonstrate your willingness. 
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APPENDIX B: INTRODUCTION LETTER FROM THE 
UNIVERSITY 
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APPENDIX C: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS (IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES) 
 
Biographical Data for all interviewees: 
Kindly provide the following details  
Age: 
Gender: 
Educational Background: 
Occupation (Job Description and Responsibilities): 
 
Face to face in-depth interview schedule for union leaders 	  
1. Please provide a brief history of your union (Date established, membership 
number, challenges and relationship with the government) 
2. Are you familiar with the Public Service Act of 2008? Why do you think 
the government enacted the Public Service Act of 2008? 
3. What are your views on the Act with regards to workers’ rights 
particularly the right to unionise and strike? 
4. How has the labour movement responded to the provisions of the Act 
particularly those relating to the right to unionise and strike? 
5. Do you think the Public Service Act 2008 complies with ILO standards? 
6. What do you think of the development of the labour movement in 
Botswana and its current state? 
7. What was the rationale for 2011 Public sector strike?  
8. What do you make of the government’s response and attitude to the 2011 
‘mother of all strikes’? 
9. Why do you think the government responded in that way?  
10. From the 2011 strikes, what would you say about the labour relations 
system of Botswana regarding the right to strike? 
11. What are the prevailing labour conditions relating to the historical public 
servants strike of 2011? 
12. What has been the relationship of the government and public sector unions 
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following the 2011 strikes?  
13. Has the relationship always been like that or there was something that 
influenced it? 
14. After the 2011 strike, there has been some developments relating to the 
2008 Act, do you feel the present legislative framework demonstrate the 
willingness of the government to grant full labour rights to workers in the 
public sector? 
15. If yes, explain how the government demonstrates this? 
16. If No, what do you think should be done for workers to be granted full 
rights? 
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Individual in-depth interview schedule for unionised and focus group questions 
for non-unionised public servants 	  
1. Are you are aware of the Public Service Act of 2008?  
2. Why do you think the government enacted the Public Service Act of 2008? 
3. What are your views on the Act? (Is it supportive of workers right to unionise 
and strike) 
4. How has the labour movement responded to the provisions of the Act 
particularly those relating to the right to unionise and strike? 
5. Does the Public Service Act, 2008 comply with ILO standards? 
6. What do you think of the development of the labour movement in Botswana 
and its current state? 
7. How would you describe the government’s response and attitude to the 2011 
‘mother of all strikes’? 
8. From the 2011 strikes, what would you say about the labour relations system 
of Botswana regarding the right to strike? 
9. What are the prevailing labour conditions relating to the historical public 
servants strike of 2011? 
10. What has been the relationship of the government and public sector unions 
following the 2011 strikes?  
11. Do you think the strike had any impact on this relationship? If yes what 
impact? 
12. After the 2011 strike the government made some changes in the legal 
framework, do you feel the present legislative framework demonstrate the 
willingness of the government to grant full labour rights to workers in the 
public sector? 
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Interview schedule for Industrial Court Personnel and Labour Relations 
Officers 	  
1. After its promulgation, the Public Service Act of 2008there was an immediate 
call for it to be amended. What was the main reason for this? 
2. What do you think of the clauses of the Act that relate to the right to strike? 
3. The Public Service Act, 2008 has been criticised by some section of public 
trade unions for its attempt to do everything (collective labour law, individual 
labour law and administrative law). What do you think of the criticisms, are 
they justified?  
4. In 2011 Botswana experienced the historic public service strikes. What do you 
think of the government’s response to the strikes?  
5. There have been some changes in some clauses of the Public Service Act after 
the 2011 strikes. What was the purpose of those amendments? 
6. It appears that the intended amendments were projected toward curtailing the 
right to strike as a reactionary move after the 2011 strike. Is this true?  
7. Is the current Public Service Act in compliance with the country’s 
international obligations as contained in the ILO standards? 
8. Are there any clauses in the Act that violate the workers’ rights to strike? 
9. The Trade Dispute Act has some clauses that permit employers to demand 
withdrawal of registration of a trade union, don't you think this has some 
elements of violation of workers’ rights to unionise and subsequently engage 
in industrial action? 
10. Does Botswana’s legal framework showcase government’s readiness to adapt 
to the new labour regime in the public service and grant full labour rights to 
workers in the public service? 
11. Does the Botswana’s labour relation system contradict the government’s 
commitment to ILO standards? 
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Interview schedule for the International Labour Organisation Personnel 
ILO has recommended eight Conventions identified as fundamental to the rights of 
human beings at work. One of these conventions is the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining.  Botswana government ratified this right in 1997. However 
there have been instances where it appears this was just in paper and not in practice.  
1. Is ILO aware of any infringement of conventions ratified by Botswana? 
2. Does ILO have any form of monitor to determine violations of conventions? 
3. How often does ILO check on member states to assess the progress of the 
ratified conventions? 
4. IN 2008, Botswana enacted Public Service Act No. 30 with the intention of 
aligning the country’s labour laws to international obligations, the Act was 
further amended to make in comply with the International Labour Laws. Is the 
ILO aware of this Act?  
5. The Botswana Public Service Act endorses the right to strike. This is in 
accordance with ILO fundamental rights, however in 2011 following the 
country’s historic public strike, a number of workers lost their jobs because 
according to the government their participation to strike was illegal. What was 
ILO’s response to this development? 
6. Following the dismissal of workers the government decided to amend the 
clause on strikes by adding number of workers classified under essential 
services. Was this not tantamount to invasion of workers right to strike? 
7. Does Botswana’s legal framework showcases government’s readiness to adapt 
to the new labour regime in the public service and grant full labour rights to 
workers in the public service? 
8. What has been ILO’s overall response to the 2011 strikes and government’s 
response?  
9. The response of the government to repress workers’ right to strike has been 
interpreted as on way of supporting IMF’s neoliberal agenda (e.g. cutting on 
wages to give way to economic growth). Some Critics argue this incapacitates 
ILO intervention in the dispute between the government and the public service 
workers. What is ILO’s relationship with IMF and how does this relationship 
affect the situation in Botswana? 
10. Does the Botswana’s labour relation system contradict the government’s 
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commitment to ILO standards? 
11. What is ILO doing to help Botswana public service workers to benefit from 
ILO conventions? 
12. Do you think the government of Botswana is ready to conform to the changed 
landscape and the potent weapon conferred to employees in industrial relations 
with regards to the right to strike?  
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